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Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of
Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers
and Recapitalizations
John C. Coffee, Jr.t and William A. Kleintt
The past decade saw the flourishing of risky, high-yield corpo-
rate debt, often called "junk" bonds." Too many companies took
on too much debt, and the chickens are now coming home to roost
as these bonds have begun to default with increasing frequency.
2
t Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
ft Professor of Law, UCLA Law School.
We are grateful for useful insights and information to Richard S. Wilson of Fitch Inves-
tors Service, Inc., to Gregory Smith of Indepth Data, Inc., and to Salomon Brothers for data
on high-yield debt restructurings. We are also indebted, for their helpful comments, to Ali-
son G. Anderson, Ronald Gilson, J. Mark Ramseyer, Mark Roe, Richard H. Sander, and
William D. Warren.
I See Securities and Exchange Commission, Recent Developments in the High Yield
Market 14-15 (1990) (staff report) ("SEC Report"); General Accounting Office, Financial
Markets: Issuers, Purchasers, and Purposes of High Yield, Non-Investment Grade Bonds
(Feb, 1988).
' The rate of defaults on junk bonds is increasing rapidly. The latest data show that
corporations defaulted or missed scheduled payments on $8.2 billion of debt, a record level,
during the first quarter of 1991, according to Moody's Investors Services, Inc. See Constance
Mitchell and Anitz Raghavan, Junk Bond Prices Hold Steady Despite Report That De-
faults Hit a Record in the Latest Period, Wall St J C17 (Apr 9, 1991).
In 1988, according to data assembled by Salomon Brothers, $2.5 billion in principal
amount of junk bonds defaulted; in 1989, $8.8 billion defaulted; and, during the first nine
months of 1990, $10.8 billion defaulted. See Anne Schwimmer, Hard Truths About the Re-
structuring Business, Investment Dealers' Digest 18 (Nov 26, 1990). One expert has esti-
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The magnitude of the problem is potentially enormous; by one es-
timate, $318 billion of debt has either defaulted already or trades
at yields indicating the market's skepticism that it will be repaid
on maturity.3
Facing the prospect of default, corporate issuers are seeking to
restructure or recapitalize their financial structures at a corre-
spondingly increased pace.4 The market force driving much of this
restructuring is the tendency for debt securities of troubled compa-
nies to trade in the secondary market at a fraction of their face
amount. Thus the issuer can repurchase these securities (or ex-
change new securities for them) at levels sometimes as low as
twenty-five to thirty percent of their face amount.5
mated that the amount of publicly held assets in bankruptcy rose from $5 billion in 1985 to
$72 billion in 1989. See Jonathan Peterson, The Bankruptcy Boom, LA Times D1 (June 3,
1990) (quoting George Putnam III, publisher of Bankruptcy Data Source).
Default on high-yield aebt has correspondingly increased. See SEC Report at 55 (cited
in note 1). At least until recently, despite a high default rate on high-yield debt, the interest
rate may have been sufficient to compensate for the defaults. See Marshall E. Blume, Don-
ald B. Keim, and Sandeep A. Patel, Returns and Volatility of Low-Grade Bonds, 1977-1989,
46 J Fin 49, 71 (1991) (finding "no evidence that low-grade bonds are significantly over- or
underpriced"); Bradford Cornell and Kevin Green, The Investment Performance of Low-
grade Bond Funds, 46 J Fin 29, 47 (1991) (finding that, after taking account of risk, "low-
grade bonds are fairly priced relative to high-grade bonds"); Edward I. Altman, Measuring
Corporate Bond Mortality and Performance, 44 J Fin 909, 920 (1989) (finding that "inves-
tors have been more than satisfactorily compensated for investing in high-risk securities");
Paul Asquith, David W. Mullins, Jr., and Eric D. Wolff, Original Issue High Yield Bonds:
Aging Analyses of Defaults, Exchanges, and Calls, 44 J Fin 923, 943-44 (1989) (reporting
high rates of default, but offering no conclusions about returns). See also Fred R. Bleakley,
Many Firms Find Debt They Piled On in 1980s Is a Cruel Taskmaster, Wall St J Al (Oct
9, 1990).
3 See Alison Leigh Cowan, Bottom Fishing With R. D. Smith, NY Times D1, D3 (Mar
29, 1991) (quoting estimate of Edward Altman, a finance professor at New York University,
that "$318 billion worth of marked-down debt.., has either defaulted or yields 10 percent-
age points or more than comparable Government securities").
4 In 1990, at least 54 companies attempted or completed recapitalizations "to keep from
crashing under the weight of overleveraged capital structures .... These companies alone
carried nearly $16 billion in junk bond debt." Laura Jereski and Jason Zweig, Step Right
Up, Folks, Forbes 74 (Mar 4, 1991). According to a survey by Salomon Brothers, corporate
issuers announced 31 exchange offers (involving $11.7 billion in high-yield securities) and 23
tender offers (involving $4.3 billion) during 1990 for their own debt securities. Corporate
issuers also completed 15 exchange offers and 16 tender offers during 1990, retiring more
than $3.8 billion in principal amount of high-yield debt and accepting for exchange over
$3.8 billion in additional debt. See Salomon Brothers, High Yield Restructurings-1990
Summary (Jan 28, 1991) ("Salomon Brothers Study") (on file with U Chi L Rev).
5 For example, Southland's Junior Subordinated Debentures traded at only 7% of face
amount before the announcement of that company's offer to repurchase; CNI offered to
repurchase its Subordinated Discount Debentures at 25% of their face amount (which, after
taking original issue discount into account, amounted to 28% of accredited book value); and
Greyhound offered to repurchase its 12/2 % Senior Subordinated Notes for cash at 271/2 %
of face amount. See Note, Debt Tender Offer Techniques and the Problem of Coercion, 91
Bondholder Coercion
Because distressed debt securities can be repurchased at a sig-
nificant discount off their face amount, a corporate issuer that is
experiencing difficulty in servicing its debt or that realizes it can-
not repay the principal on maturity has essentially three options
by which it can preserve economic value for its shareholders. First,
the issuer can make a tender offer-either a cash offer or an "ex-
change offer"-6-at a price somewhat over the trading price, but
well below the face amount, of the outstanding debt securities.
Second, without making a tender offer, the issuer can repurchase
(either in the market or in private negotiations) sufficient debt se-
curities to enable it to pay off the remaining debtholders in the
class on maturity. The issuer may make such purchases at widely
varying prices or on specially tailored terms that reflect the negoti-
ating position of the particular holder, and may not afford all hold-
ers the opportunity to sell.7 Finally, the issuer can seek approval of
a "prepackaged" plan of reorganization under the Bankruptcy
Code. Under such a plan, bondholders would approve a mandatory
exchange of securities at or before the time the bankruptcy peti-
tion is filed.8 The advantage of such "prepackaged bankruptcies" is
Colum L Rev 846, 849 nn 19-20 (1991). Recently, R. H. Macy & Company, the retailer,
spent $117 million repurchasing its own bonds. The $117 million price was only 42% of the
bonds' $276 million book value. See Floyd Norris, Macy Profit Tied to Bond Repurchases,
NY Times D1 (Mar 19, 1991).
£ This term refers to an exchange of one security for another. Exchange offers may
include an offer of a debt or equity security, or a package of such securities, possibly with
cash or warrants also, for the outstanding class of debt security.
For general overviews of the use of exchange offers to restructure corporate debt, see
Patricia A. Vlahakis, Deleveraging-A Search for Rules in a Financial Free-for-All, in Ar-
nold W. Sametz, ed, Institutional Investing: The Challenges and Responsibilities of the
21st Century 468-98 (Business One Irwin, 1991); Robert E. Spatt and Benedict Tai, Re-
structuring Public Debt of Highly Leveraged Entities, 6 M&A and Corp Governance L Rptr
699 (1991); Nicholas P. Saggese, Gregg A. Noel, and Michael E. Mohr, A Practitioner's
Guide to Exchange Offers and Consent Solicitations, 24 Loyola LA L Rev 527 (1991); Note,
91 Colum L Rev 846 (cited in note 5); Note, Distress-Contingent Convertible Bonds: A
Proposed Solution to the Excess Debt Problem, 104 Harv L Rev 1857 (1991).
7 The corporate issuer does not always initiate these negotiations. Often, certain large
institutional investors, known as "vulture funds," will "quietly accumulate positions in dis-
tressed companies' bonds and agree to sell those bonds back to the company for a profit, but
still much lower than par." Anne Schwimmer, Vulture Funds Add to Workout Complexity,
3 Mergers & Acquisitions Rptr 2 (No 50, Dec 17, 1990). For a more complete discussion of
vulture funds, see text accompanying notes 23-25.
1 See 11 USC § 1126(b) (1988) (permitting a binding vote prior to the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy). See Leigh Henry, Prepackaged Bankruptcy Works for Those With
Money and Vision, 5 Turnarounds & Workouts 1 (No 2, Feb 1, 1991); Richard D. Hylton,
Prepackaging a Bankruptcy, NY Times C2 (Nov 26, 1990).
For overviews of the tactical and legal issues surrounding "prepackaged bankruptcies,"
see John J. Huber, Bryan B. Edwards, and Jeffrey C. Soza, Restructuring High-Yield Se-
curities Through Prepackaged Bankruptcies, 5 Insights 3 (No 5, May 1991); Stephen Case
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that, if the requisite majority of "two thirds in amount and more
than one-half in number of the allowed claims"9 consents, then the
exchange offer-restyled as a reorganization plan-binds the mi-
nority as well. In short, there can be no holdouts. This last tech-
nique is becoming more popular. 10
The corporate issuer often employs these three techniques, not
in isolation, but in sequence. Usually, the issuer will make an ex-
change offer to the holders, and then may privately negotiate with
holders who have not tendered." Finally, if it cannot obtain the
percentage it desires, the issuer may terminate its tender offer and
turn to a prepackaged bankruptcy plan, in effect seeking a
mandatory exchange on terms similar to the prior voluntary ex-
change."2 The common backdrop to the issuer's efforts to restruc-
and Mitchell Harwood, Current Issues in Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plans of Reorganization
and Using the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act for Instant Reorganizations (unpub-
lished paper prepared for Bankruptcy Law Symposium sponsored by the New York Univer-
sity of Law, the Annual Survey of American Law, and the John J. Galgay Fellowship Pro-
gram, Apr. 12, 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev). For further discussion of prepackaged
bankruptcies, see text accompanying notes 113-28.
9 See 11 USC § 1126(c) (1988).
10 See Salomon Brothers Study at 1 (cited in note 4) ("The number of issuers seeking
bondhoider approval of prepackaged bankruptcy reorganization plans concurrent with dis-
tressed exchange offers is growing."). During 1990, Interco, Inc., Tracor Inc., The Southland
Corp., and JPS Textile Group, Inc. turned to prepackaged bankruptcy plans after failing to
obtain bondholder approval of an exchange offer. See id at 8, 11, 13. In late 1990, Trump
Taj Mahal Funding Inc., a part of Donald Trump's financial empire, and Price Communica-
tions Corp. also made exchange offers as part of a prepackaged bankruptcy plan. Id at 4.
But another study has concluded that "[iun practice, successful prepackaged filings are
extremely rare." Stuart C. Gilson, Kose John, and Larry H. P. Lang, Troubled Debt
Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms in Default, 27 J
Fin Econ 315, 325 (1990). This study observed that, in a sample of 80 firms that restruc-
tured debt outside of bankruptcy in 1978 through 1987, "publicly traded debt is always
restructured through exchange offers." Id at 323. We believe these studies differ because of
timing- prepackaged bankruptcies emerged as a viable option for debt restructuring in 1990.
12 A variation on this pattern is to terminate the exchange offer, return all the tendered
debt securities, and then begin private negotiations. During 1990, International Controls
Corp. did this after failing to obtain the 80% in principal amount of each issue it had
sought. It announced vaguely that it would purchase the debentures either in the open mar-
ket or in private transactions. Salomon Brothers Study at 10 (cited in note 4). Similarly, G-I
Holdings Inc. turned to private purchases after its exchange offer expired. Id at 9. In an-
other more extreme variation, Michelin Finance terminated its cash tender offer in 1990 for
the notes of its subsidiary, Uniroyal Goodrich Tire. Michelin "declined to negotiate with an
adversarial bondholder group ... [and] filed to deregister the bonds from filing require-
ments with the SEC." Id at 15.
12 The Southland Corporation, Tracor Corp., Interco, Inc., and JPS Textile Group, Inc.
all followed this sequence during 1990. See note 116. For the full account of the involved
negotiations at Southland, see In re Southland Corporation, 124 Bankr 211 (Bankr N D
Tex 1991). Similarly, Republic Health Company turned to a prepackaged plan after two
years of negotiation with and among its creditors proved unsuccessful. See Henry, 5 Turn-
arounds & Workouts at 2 (cited in note 8).
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Bondholder Coercion
ture its creditors' claims is the likelihood that a prolonged bank-
ruptcy proceeding will harm all the participants. In fact, only one
in ten companies that file for Chapter 11 protection successfully
emerges with a confirmed plan of reorganization."' In the view of
the professionals in this field, the cost and delay of bank-
ruptcy-the high legal and administrative expenses, the disruption
of business planning, and the possibility of losing customers and
suppliers during this uncertain interim-make avoiding bank-
ruptcy (except on a "prepackaged" basis) the common goal of all
creditors.
14
Attempts by issuers to reduce and restructure their debt by
exchanging new securities for outstanding securities are not legally
objectionable, and indeed are socially desirable to the extent that
they spare society the deadweight loss of bankruptcy costs. But the
use of coercive means that threaten bondholders with being made
worse off if they decline the exchange does raise serious legal is-
sues. Corporate issuers may coerce such exchanges in one of two
ways: First, creditors report that the debtor corporation often
manipulates the threat of bankruptcy to force the debtholders to
accept its proposed exchange. 5 Second, issuers may seek to amend
the indenture under which the bonds were issued either to strip
the outstanding bonds of their protective covenants or to
subordinate them to the new class of debt securities exchanged for
's Henry, 5 Turnarounds & Workouts at 2 (cited in note 8) (citing study by Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts). The odds are, however, much better for
"prepackaged" plans. Id.
14 See Sharon Reier, Bankruptcy Boondoggle, Fin World 36, 38 (Oct 16, 1990). See also
Mark M. Jaffe, Chapter 11 Strategies and Techniques-Creditors Committees, Effective
Use of Plan Provisions, Objections to Confirmation, Financing a Chapter 11 Case,
"Cramdown" and How It Works, 59 Tulane L Rev 1298, 1306 (1985).
We believe that bankruptcy costs are substantial, particularly for those issuers whose
bondholders have accepted coercive exchange offers. In these cases, high bankruptcy costs
do arm the issuer with substantial leverage, by which the issuer can negotiate a pre-bank-
ruptcy reduction in its indebtedness that still leaves the shareholders owning substantial
equity in the corporation. We appreciate that the academic literature has long debated the
size and significance of bankruptcy costs. See notes 43-46.
lB Wilbur Ross of Rothschild Co., probably the best known bankruptcy adviser among
investment bankers, observes:
A lot of games are played with Chapter 11. A lot of issuers deliberately set up a period
where they go into default. Sometimes, companies threaten bankruptcy. Then the com-
panies paint a picture of gloom and doom of what will happen. What usually happens
is that the company no longer pays interest on unsecured debt and that saves it cash at
the bondholders' expense.
Reier, Fin World at 38 (cited in note 14).
1991"]
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them.'" Both techniques have the same aim: to induce bondholders
to accept an exchange that they would otherwise refuse. In this
Article, we will principally address the legitimacy of the second
technique, but many of our conclusions apply to the first as well.
Ultimately, in this Article, we will argue that the problem of
bondholder coercion involves more than simply extortion by the
issuer: coercion can be good or bad, depending on the circum-
stances. But, in Parts I and II, we start by demonstrating how issu-
ers frequently use the threat of bankruptcy or adverse indenture
amendments to force creditors to accept an unfavorable recapitali-
zation, which allows shareholders to continue to own a significant
portion of the firm's equity even though the firm has not met its
obligations to its creditors.' 7 Specifically, we demonstrate that, by
exploiting the threat that bondholders will be made worse off, cor-
porations can achieve favorable recapitalizations through exchange
offers that put the bondholders into a kind of prisoner's dilemma,
thereby coercing the bondholders to accept an amendment to their
indenture that in their unconstrained choice they would reject.
These threats thus render at least partially obsolete the simple
notion that equity is subordinate to debt.'8 Indeed, the disclosure
16 The Salomon Brothers Study of all 1990 high-yield restructurings counts 26 com-
pleted or abandoned transactions and five pending transactions in which issuers sought a
bondholder vote to amend the indenture under which their bonds were issued. Salomon
Brothers Study (cited in note 4).
17 Bankruptcy also raises a moral hazard problem. Shareholders may change the busi-
ness and financial policy of the firm to take long-shot risks that, if successful, will avert
insolvency. We do not focus on these possible problems, but only on the gaming behavior
that the issuer's management may adopt in proposing a recapitalization. Shareholders have
no rational interest in proposing an exchange offer or other reorganization that does not
leave them some interest in the reconstituted firm (even if the firm is insolvent and they
have no strict legal right to such an interest). If bankruptcy threatens bondholders with
unnecessary and avoidable losses, it is in the shareholders' interest to exploit this threat to
obtain at least a small share of the reorganized firm.
18 Commentators generally agree that equityholders typically receive some value in
bankruptcy even when senior claimants are not fully compensated. But they disagree over
the magnitude of this problem. Some argue that "pro-debtor bankruptcy judges are violat-
ing creditor contracts." Lawrence A. Weiss, Beware the Bankruptcy Judges, NY Times Fl
(Apr 28, 1991). But an important recent empirical study concludes that this view exagger-
ates the amount received by the equityholders and the difficulty of resisting their demands.
See Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U Pa L Rev 125
(1990).
One empirical study finds that the amount paid to shareholders in excess of what they
would have received under the absolute priority rule was on average 7.6% of the total value
paid. See Allan C. Eberhart, William T. Moore, and Rodney L. Roenfeld, Security Pricing
and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J Fin 1457,
1458 (1990). See also Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Viola-
tion of Priority of Claims, 27 J Fin Econ 285, 299 (1990) (strict priority of claims is violated
in 78% of the cases studied).
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requirements of the federal securities laws actually enhance these
threats: The offering documents used by the issuer often contain a
"liquidation analysis" that compares what bondholders would re-
ceive in bankruptcy to the corporation's offer. Such disclosures
usually suggest that the bondholder will be significantly worse off
if the corporation withdraws the offer and enters bankruptcy."9
This spectacle of the corporation threatening to "welch" on its
debts may account for the highly skeptical reception that issuer
debt tender offers have received in the financial press.20
Nevertheless, as we indicated above, it oversimplifies to treat
bondholder coercion as simply extortion by the corporate issuer.
Indeed, an exclusive focus on the corporate issuer misses half the
story. We have seen that rational bondholders should be willing to
scale down their claims in order to avoid the high costs and uncer-
tainty of bankruptcy. Yet, they in fact have great difficulty in
achieving out-of-court consensual restructurings."' In particular,
exchange offers made by a distressed issuer to its bondholders reg-
ularly fail.22 The evidence then seems to present a paradox: By all
accounts, bondholders fear bankruptcy and want to achieve a con-
sensual scaling down of their claims that avoids its high costs and
uncertainty. Yet, they in fact have great difficulty in achieving this
goal.
10 See Note, 91 Colum L Rev at 850 (cited in note 5), for a review of offering materials
in several recent tender offers. For example, the Southland Proxy Statement and Prospec-
tus, dated October 5, 1990, estimated that most bondholders would receive nothing in liqui-
dation, except for one class of senior noteholders that would receive 39% of face amount. Id
at 850 n 23. In the Bond Brewing Holdings, Ltd. tender offer, the Offer to Purchase and
Consent Solicitation estimated that bondholders would eventually receive between 25% and
37% of face amount if the company entered bankruptcy, as compared to the immediate
tender price of 40% of face amount. Id at 850.
20 See, for example, Benjamin J. Stein, Insult to Injury: Junk Holders Get Offers They
Should, But Can't Refuse, Barron's 42 (May 28, 1990); Matthew Schifrin, Enough Already,
Forbes 126 (May 28, 1990).
11 As of late 1990, "only two out-of-court restructurings of distressed, highly leveraged
companies had actually been accomplished." Schwimmer, Investment Dealers' Digest at 20
(cited in note 2). This conclusion may overstate the evidence somewhat. During 1990, In-
silco, International Controls, Interco, JPS Textile, and Southland were all unsuccessful in
their attempted exchange offers when bondholders did not tender the minimum amounts
they required. Salomon Brothers Study at 1 (cited in note 4). Figure 4 to the Salomon
Brothers Study shows that at least 11 other exchange offers were terminated during 1990.
Id at 8-18. But even if 16 offers failed, another 31 exchange offers and 23 tender offers were
successfully completed during 1990 (although not all were necessarily made by "distressed,
highly leveraged companies"). Id.
22 See Schwimmer, Investment Dealers' Digest at 20 (cited in note 2) ("Indeed, ex-
change offers are failing with increased frequency as bondholders refuse to settle at the
offered terms."). See also data cited in note 27.
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In Part III, we explain this seeming paradox by identifying a
new player on the financial scene: the vulture fund. Vulture funds
are institutional investors that invest in distressed bonds, buying
them at a fraction of their face amount in anticipation of a restruc-
turing.23 Such investors often aim for a thirty percent profit or
more on a short-term investment. More significantly, vulture funds
are inclined to hold out for disproportionate repayment of the
bonds that they purchased at a marked discount. By holding out,
vulture funds may succeed in being repaid in full at maturity. In so
doing, however, they impede the ability of the majority of the
bondholders to achieve a consensual scaling down of the debtor
corporation's over-leveraged capital structure that demands a pro
rata sacrifice by each bondholder to avoid the greater losses inci-
dent to bankruptcy.2 '4 Both the corporate debtor and the other
bondholders realize that if a significant percentage of the
debtholders spurn the proposed recapitalization then any savings
realized by the corporation will simply go on maturity to pay off
the claims of these holdouts. At present, there is reason to believe
that if as few as five to ten percent of the bondholders hold out,
they will soak up the gains from the consensual scaling down by
their fellow creditors.
25
23 For recent accounts of the vulture fund, see Schwimmer, 3 Mergers & Acquisitions
Rptr 2 (cited in note 7); David Carey, Bankruptcy Buzzards, Fin World 60 (Jan 22, 1991);
John Egan, Vulture Play, Fin World 41 (Mar 19, 1991); Matthew Schifrin, Pay Up ... or
Else, Forbes 74 (Aug 6, 1990). Increasingly, vulture funds are mutual funds. See Carey, Fin
World at 60-61. 1
Three of the leading players in the "vulture fund" field are Martin Whitman of Whit-
man, Heffernan & Rhein (which now manages two mutual funds), see Carey, Fin World at
61; Randall Smith of R. D. Smith & Co., see Cowan, NY Times at D6 (cited in note 3); and
Stanford Phelps. In particular, Mr. Phelps's much publicized actions-buying high-yield
debt at prices equivalent to 10% of the security's face amount and then holding out, even
when 95% of the other bondholders accept management's proposed recapitalization-have
given rise to the phrase "bondmail." See Stacy Soltis, Bondholder Stan Phelps Finds Mus-
cling Debtors Can Only Get You So Far, 4 Turnarounds & Workouts 1, 2 (No 15, Oct 1,
1990); Matthew Schifrin, Sellers Beware, Forbes 36 (Jan 21, 1991).
2' For an earlier article recognizing that avoiding bankruptcy by scaling down the cor-
poration's debts is desirable, see Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts,
97 Yale L J 232 (1987). For an overview of how such a contractual solution can be achieved,
see Howard J. Kashner, Majority Clauses and Non-Bankruptcy Corporate Reorganiza-
tions-Contractual and Statutory Alternatives, 44 Bus Law 123 (1988).
11 The fact that most issuers now specify minimum tender conditions of 90% to 95%
(before they are obligated to accept tendered bonds) is evidence of their view that a higher
holdout rate destroys the value of the recapitalization to them. To illustrate, assume that
Debtor Corp. has $1 billion in junk bonds outstanding, which will mature in two years, but
which its management realizes Debtor cannot repay. Assume its bonds are trading at 50% of
their face amount, which price partly reflects the expected additional losses to bondholders
if the firm were to enter bankruptcy.
1214 [58:1207
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Recognizing this danger, both the corporate debtor and the
other bondholders typically respond ex ante by insisting that the
exchange offer be conditioned on some high minimum tender
level-usually, ninety or ninety-five percent.2 6 For example, the of-
fer may state that the issuer may terminate it if less than ninety-
five percent of the principal amount of the outstanding bonds are
tendered. This condition not only protects shareholders and the
majority of the bondholders, but also explains why such offers fre-
quently fail: The high minimum tender condition frequently can-
not be satisfied, particularly when vulture fund investors have ac-
quired their interest in order to hold out for special treatment.
Believing that Debtor cannot possibly pay more than $700 million when these bonds
mature, management proposes to exchange a package of securities having an expected value
of $650 million (thus preserving a small $50 million "stub" value for its shareholders) for the
outstanding bonds worth $1 billion. This $650 million offer is a $150 million premium over
the market value of $500 million. But the vulture fund investors may still hold out, believing
that the firm can pay their claims in full on maturity if most of the other bondholders
exchange their bonds pursuant to the firm's offer.
Suppose then that 85% of the bondholders tender and 15% hold out. The tendering
bondholders receive a package of securities equal to $552.5 million (85% of $650 million),
but the holdouts remain entitled to $150 million (15% of $1 billion). As a result, the total
debt claims ($552.5 million plus $150 million) against the firm exceed $702 million. (Re-
member that the Debtor could not repay more than $700 million). The recapitalization has
thus failed to scale down Debtor's debt to a manageable level, and the holdouts have effec-
tively seized the small stub equity value. Put simply, the holdouts have soaked up the gains
from the consensual scaling down. If Debtor were to consummate this exchange offer, it
would not only extinguish the value of the equity held by its own stockholders, but it would
also simply transfer wealth from the majority of the bondholders that tendered to the mi-
nority that held out.
Let us explain some of the assumptions in this example. First, we assumed that the
bonds were trading below their actual value-i.e., the value of Debtor if Debtor were to
apply all of its cash flow and liquidate all of its assets in order to fund their repayment.
Debtor could pay $700 million, but the market "prices" the bonds at only $500 million.
There are three explanations for this discount of $200 million: First, management may
have non-public information, so that management can better estimate Debtor's ability to
repay on the bonds' maturity. Rationally, management might not release such information,
because it wants the bonds to trade at a discount in order to economize on their repurchase.
Second, the market for distressed debt securities may be inefficient. This is certainly the
popular impression. See note 30 and accompanying text. Finally, even if the secondary debt
market is efficient, the market price may be accurately discounting the likely loss in the
bonds' value due to bankruptcy costs (if the firm files a Chapter 11 petition), or to opportu-
nistic behavior by management, such as delaying the reorganization in order to secure
greater compensation for shareholders. For a discussion of bankruptcy costs, see text accom-
panying notes 43-47.
26 Unless it binds itself not to, the corporation can waive this minimum tender condi-
tion. However, bondholders have sometimes demanded that the condition be non-waivable
in order to protect tendering bondholders from holdouts. See In re Southland Corporation,
124 Bankr at 126 (bondholders steering committee insisted on non-waivable 95% tender
condition to prevent "windfall" to non-tendering bondholders). In fact, the Salomon Broth-
ers Study notes that a 90% to 95% minimum tender condition has now become "typical."
Salomon Brothers Study at 1 (cited in note 4).
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The bottom line, then, is that the bondholder's problem is
two-sided: The bondholder must fear both the issuer's threats and
its fellow bondholders' opportunism. In this light, coercion can be
either good or bad. On the one hand, as we have already noted,
coercion may allow the issuer (and, by extension, its stockholders)
to "welch" on its indebtedness. On the other hand, the holdout
problem may justify some coercion in order to prevent the minor-
ity from frustrating the majority's interest in achieving a necessary
scaling down of the corporation's debt in a way that taxes all bond-
holders evenly. Today, corporate issuers prefer to threaten poten-
tial holdouts by conditioning their exchange offer on a requirement
that a majority of the bondholders vote, at or before the time they
tender into the issuer's offer, to amend the indenture to eliminate
all or most of its protective covenants. This "stripping" of the
covenants makes the bonds a less attractive investment to those
who would otherwise hold out, and thus it may induce them to
accept the exchange offer.
This two-sided nature to the problem of coercion may explain
the current division among commentators. Some view debt tender
offers in sanguine terms as a rational effort by sophisticated bond-
holders to take collective action.28 Others characterize debt tender
offers as sinister attempts by corporations to coerce their bond-
holders into sacrificing their debt claims by threatening to worsen
their condition.29 It is our position in this Article that both sides in
this debate are correct-at least some of the time. Whether bond-
holder coercion is justified depends on whose decision is being en-
forced, the technique used, and the degree of organization within
the particular group of bondholders. Accordingly, neither public
2 The Salomon Brothers Study shows that at least 26 high-yield restructuring transac-
tions, in which corporate issuers solicited bondholder consents to amend the indenture
under which the debt securities were issued, were completed during 1990. Generally, the
amendments would eliminate restrictive covenants; in a few cases, they would also
subordinate the untendered old securities to the new securities or, in the case of secured
debt, would release collateral pledged to support the old securities. See Salomon Brothers
Study at 8-18 (cited in note 4). The study lists a total of 53 transactions, although many of
these were relatively minor restructurings and may not have involved distressed companies.
In addition, 5 other transactions, in which the issuer was seeking bondholder consents as
part of a high-yield restructuring, were in progress on December 31, 1990: Banner Indus-
tries, Inc., Price Communications Corp., LVI Group, Inc., Service America Corp., and Divi
Hotels N.V. Id at 3-6.
" See Note, 91 Colum L Rev at 890 (cited in note 5).
29 See Note, 104 Harv L Rev at 1860-66 (cited in note 6) (recognizing that there are
both "holdout" and "hold-up" problems). See also Stein, Barron's at 42 (cited in note 20);
Schifrin, Enough Already!, Forbes 126 (cited in note 20).
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policy nor private contracting should seek to preclude, in the ab-
stract, all use of "coercive" cash or exchange offers for debt securi-
ties. Nor should such techniques be wholly legitimized. Rather,
public policy should seek to shift control over the coercive poten-
tial from the corporate issuer to a majority of the bondholders.
The majority would then be able to discipline an opportunistic mi-
nority that is seeking to hold out and receive a disproportionate
share of the distressed debtor's assets.
In Part IV, we propose a regime that would accomplish this
goal: an exchange offer procedure in which the offer is conditioned
on the prior and independent consent of the bondholders of the
amendment of the indenture agreement. We will demonstrate that
this proposed regime prevents the corporation from subjecting the
bondholders to the coercive prisoner's dilemma. We also discuss
other alternative means of recapitalization, such as the prepack-
aged bankruptcy, which can help to solve the holdout problems
posed by the vulture funds. Although the prepackaged bankruptcy
is only coming into use today, the availability of this less coercive
alternative at the very least eliminates any justification for the co-
ercive exchange offers that corporations presently use.
Finally, in Part V, we present different legal theories by which
courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission could imple-
ment our proposed standard. We also propose model indenture
language that would accomplish the same result through private
contracting.
I. EMPIRICAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE DEBT MARKET
Three factors distinguish trading in distressed debt securities
from trading in equity securities. First, most observers have de-
scribed the secondary market in debt securities as an inefficient
market: volatile price swings are common, information is scarce,
and liquidity is often lackingY° Second, substantial bankruptcy
costs are risked if the corporation enters reorganization. As a re-
SO For example, one New York Times reporter, after interviewing key traders and par-
ticipants in this market, described the debt market as follows:
The market.., is by any definition an inefficient and underregulated backwater of the
securities business. Information is scarce, securities practically trade by appointment,
and brokers charge as much as 2 percent of the trade for lining up the buyer and seller,
or for keeping a risky, illiquid security in inventory.
Cowan, NY Times at D6 (cited in note 3). For a similar description, see Diana B. Henriques,
Playing the Bankruptcy "Endgame", NY Times F15 (Sep 23, 1990). Others suggest that
"trading on inside information is apparently rampant" in this area. Schifrin, Sellers Beware,
Forbes at 36 (cited in note 23).
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sult, the success or failure of pre-bankruptcy negotiations can sig-
nificantly affect the value of the bondholders' securities. Third,
bondholders, more so than stockholders, can often organize to take
collective action.
A. Market Inefficiency and Asymmetric Information
Our belief in the inefficiency of the high-yield debt market fol-
lows from both the absence of regular trading and the scarcity of
information. First, there is simply not a liquid auction market, or
even continuous trading, in debt securities, at least not of the kind
that is available for equity securities of the same issuers. 1 Hence,
most trading is in private negotiations, and other bondholders are
not necessarily aware of recent prices or trading information.
Second, information about debt securities is often inadequate.
Information often reaches public bondholders considerably later
than it reaches bank creditors and others who deal with corporate
management on a continuing basis.32 Corporations in bankruptcy
may cease to file, or become delinquent in filing, periodic informa-
tion with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). More-
over, current law does not require an issuer to continue to file peri-
odic information with the SEC if it has neither a security listed on
a national securities exchange nor a class of equity security held by
300 or more persons. 3 As a result of leveraged buyouts, many for-
merly public corporations are able to deregister with the SEC, even
though their bonds remain outstanding. Thereafter, these corpora-
tions provide only the minimal information required by the bond
31 While the daily trading volume of bonds is more than double that of common stock,
the New York Stock Exchange "handled only 0.2% of the daily turnover." J. Edmund Col-
loton, Bondholder Communications-The Missing Link in High Yield Debt 18 (Report for
Hill and Knowlton, Inc., 1990). The market for high-yield debt has also been particularly
thin since the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1989. See Anise C. Wallace, "Junk
Bond" Dealers Are Betting on a New, Slimmer Market, NY Times F12 (Apr 1, 1990).
' For such a view by an experienced investment officer at one of the largest institu-
tional investors (TIAA/CREF), see Sharon F. Manewit, The Corporate Bondholder in
Workouts and Bankruptcies, in Sametz, ed, Institutional Investing 499, 502 (cited in note
6) ("In most instances, public bondholders are unaware of the early stages of a workout.
Generally, the first to be in a position to recognize that a problem exists or is about to occur
are the company's bank lenders.").
33 Under § 12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, an issuer must enter the
SEC's periodic reporting system and file the reports mandated by § 13 of that Act once it
has more than 500 shareholders of record. However, the issuer may deregister under
§ 12(g)(4) once the number of holders of record of this class falls below 300. If the bonds are
listed on a national securities exchange, § 12(b) will require periodic information until the
issuer takes the bonds off the list.
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indenture.3 4 A recent Wall Street Journal survey found that bonds
that are not exchange-listed may be simultaneously traded at very
different prices by different brokerage firms 3 5-the result one
would expect from a market characterized by irregular trading and
little publicly available information.
Most importantly, the securities analyst-the intermediary
whom many observers see as the principal mechanism of capital
market efficiency-simply plays less of a role in the market for dis-
tressed debt." Relatively few firms research distressed securities
because consumer demand is small: typically only specialized firms
with a taste for risky investments trade in such securities. As a
result, the spread between bid and asked prices-one measure of a
market's efficiency-is often much wider for distressed debt than
for other securities.37 One debt rating service publishes a list of
debt securities whose investment value is, in the judgment of the
service, significantly above their trading value (sometimes by thirty
percent or more).38 When market and investment value deviate
this much, it is difficult to call such a market efficient.
Ultimately, however, it is not necessary to accept our claim
that the market for distressed debt securities is relatively ineffi-
cient to conclude that market prices in this market do not necessa-
rily reflect investment value if all material information about the
bonds were released. The standard definition of market efficiency
is that "prices at any time 'fully reflect' all available informa-
34 See Laura Jereski, None of Your Business, Forbes 68 (Apr 29, 1991) (some
debtholders complain that "[b]onds are harder to price and trade without public informa-
tion, and ... some companies take advantage of the lack of information to buy in their
bonds in the open market.").
" See Laurie P. Cohen, Let the Small Investor Beware Those Junk Bond Prices, Wall
St J C1 (Mar 18, 1991) (Prudential and Merrill Lynch simultaneously quoting bid prices of
$95 and $88, respectively, for the same high-yield debt security. However, this survey found
that exchange-listed debt securities traded at comparable prices.).
36 Proponents of the efficient market hypothesis recognize that the market may be less
efficient with respect to forms of new information that are costly to acquire or verify. See
Ronald J. Gilson and Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va L
Rev 549, 626 & n 205 (1984), and studies cited therein. They acknowledge that those trading
in the market may have insufficient incentive to invest in attempting to value such informa-
tion. See James H. Bjerring, Josef Lakonishok, and Theo Vermaelen, Stock Prices and Fi-
nancial Analysts' Recommendations, 38 J Fin 187 (1983). Such a description fits the market
for distressed debt securities, where debt trading is thin to sporadic and the demand for
securities analysts' services is correspondingly reduced.
'7 See Henriques, NY Times at F15 (cited in note 30) (noting bid and asked prices of
$40 and $60 for high-yield notes of Taj Mahal Casino). Such wide disparities tend to be
short-lived.
" See Alexandra Ourusoff, The Junketeers, Fin World 64, 66 (Oct 1, 1991) (ratings of
Fitch Investors Service Company predicted recovery value with trading price).
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tion."39 But market prices in any market can seldom "fully reflect"
information that the issuer has not publicly released (i.e., "inside
information"). As a result, an issuer considering an exchange offer
for its distressed debt securities has a perverse incentive to with-
hold positive information from the market, in order to increase the
discount by which the bonds trade below their face amount. The
greater the discount, the greater the bargain the issuer gains by
repurchasing the bonds-even at a premium over their market
price. Indeed, by withholding information, the issuer may convince
the market that the degree of financial distress is far worse than it
actually is.40 Given the usual bias of management toward maximiz-
ing the firm's share price, the market may not expect such a tactic,
and, in any event, risk-averse, smaller bondholders are ill-equipped
to call management's bluff.4
In summary, in a world of high price volatility and scarce in-
formation, the fact that an issuer's exchange offer is above the cur-
rent market price carries less assurance that the offered price is
"fair" than it would for other securities.
42
B. The Impact of Bankruptcy Costs on the Value of Debt
Securities
The second distinctive feature about the market for distressed
debt securities is the magnitude of bankruptcy costs. The trustee
will finance the legal and other costs of administering the bank-
"9 See, for example, Gilson and Kraakman, 70 Va L Rev at 554-55 (cited in note 36)
(citing Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J Fin 383 (1970)).
"o Then Professor Easterbrook and Professor Fischel argue that when a firm suspends
or reduces its information flow "investors always assume the worst. [Corporations] must
disclose the bad with the good, lest investors assume that the bad is even worse off than it
is." Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 Va L Rev 669, 683 (1984). We agree with this statement as a generalization
that silence implies disaster, but here it creates an easily manipulated tactic by which to
depress the bonds' market value. Indeed, once the issuer announces its tender or exchange
offer, it can then make full disclosure to avoid antifraud liability. But at this point, any
rebound in the bonds' value will appear to be a response to the offer and not a reflection of
new information about investment value.
421 Vulture funds may be less susceptible to such a tactic, and this may partially explain
their tendency to hold out.
42 In an efficient market, it is frequently argued that the market price is the best, most
reliable estimate of actual value, and an offered price above the market price cannot be
"unfair." See, for example, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv L Rev 1161, 1182-90 (1981).
But see Saul Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 Va L Rev 645,




ruptcy proceeding, and thus will have a senior claim against the
bankrupt estate to which the existing creditors will be subordi-
nated."s But the more important cost of bankruptcy may be the
adverse effect of uncertainty and judicial control on business plan-
ning, customer loyalty, and trade creditors." Scholars have long
debated the magnitude of bankruptcy costs, 45 but the fairest gen-
eralization is that bankruptcy costs differ significantly across in-
dustries. In industries where customers or suppliers depend upon
the long-term existence of a firm, bankruptcy costs may be high
because customers may transfer their loyalties to a competitor, and
because suppliers may begin to withhold products or services.46 Fi-
4' See 11 USC §§ 327(a), 1107 (1988) (granting authority to trustee and/or debtor in
possession to issue certificates to cover administration expenses).
The most recent, and probably the most comprehensive, study of the costs of bank-
ruptcy reports that "on average, direct [administrative] costs of bankruptcy are 3.1% of the
book value of debt plus the market value of equity of the fiscal year end prior to the bank-
ruptcy filing, with a range from 1% to 6.6%." Weiss, 27 J Fin Econ at 299 (cited in note 18).
Earlier studies also reported modest direct costs. See James S. Ang, Jess H. Chua, and John
J. McConnell, The Administrative Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Note, 37 J Fin 219,
224 (1982) (finding that the median administrative cost is about 2% of the value of assets);
Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J Fin 337, 343 (1977) (a study of
eleven railroad bankruptcies, finding that direct costs average 5.3% of the market value of
the firm's securities at the date of the filing of the petition).
'4 Nevins Baxter, a professor of finance, has observed:
Perhaps the most important cost of bankruptcy proceedings is the negative effect that
financial embarrassment may have on the stream of net operating earnings of the busi-
ness firm. The firm may find it very difficult to obtain trade credit, [and] customers
may question its reliability and permanence as a source of supply and may choose to
deal elsewhere. Questionable financial condition may be equivalent to negative public-
ity about the integrity of the firm.
Nevins D. Baxter, Leverage, Risk of Ruin and the Cost of Capital, 22 J Fin 395, 399 (1967).
' See Merton H. Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J Fin 261, 262-63 (1977). Miller relied on
a study by Professor Jerold Warner, see Warner, 32 J Fin at 341 (cited in note 43), that
tabulated the direct costs of bankruptcy for a sample of eleven railroads that filed bank-
ruptcy petitions between 1930 and 1955. That study estimated that these costs averaged
only 5.3% of the market value of the firm's securities as of the date of the petition's filing.
Miller, 32 J Fin at 262-63. This modest number may be a product of the fact that railroads
are a natural monopoly; in any event, it does not include the indirect costs of lost customers
and suppliers. Another study of smaller firms found median administrative costs in bank-
ruptcy to be about 2% of the value of the assets. See Ang, Chua, and McConnell, 37 J Fin
219 (cited in note 43). Other scholars have claimed that bankruptcy costs cannot be signifi-
cant because they should be limited by the costs of informal, consensual reorganization. See
Robert A. Haugen and Lemma W. Senbet, The Insignificance of Bankruptcy Costs to the
Theory of Optimal Capital Structure, 33 J Fin 383 (1978). But, as recent bondholder work-
outs have shown, informal reorganizations may be difficult to achieve because of the prob-
lem of holdouts. Hence, this argument proves little. Moreover, none of these studies re-
sponds to more recent research which shows that stockholders obtain a higher percentage of
the firm's value than they are entitled to receive under the absolute priority rule. See
sources cited in note 18.
4' For example, customers of a computer manufacturer might feel that it is unsafe to
remain dependent on the manufacturer if it enters bankruptcy, because they are uncertain
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nally, legal proceedings are always susceptible to delay, during
which the issuer will not pay interest on the debt to the unsecured
debtholders. Thus the time value of money causes delay to be more
costly to the creditors than to the shareholders, if they participate
in the reorganization.4" In contrast, a consensual renegotiation of
the creditors' claims (whether through an exchange offer or a
prepackaged bankruptcy plan) may only take several weeks.
It is therefore realistic to believe that management's threat to
file a Chapter 11 petition may induce bondholders to accept an
exchange offer that they would decline if it were not backstopped
by the prospect of a bankruptcy reorganization as the alternative.
C. The Potential for Collective Action by Debtholders
Finally, concentrated ownership of distressed securities sug-
gests that debtholders (much more so than equityholders) may
often be able to engage in collective action. Often, high-yield debt
securities are sold in private placements to a limited group of insti-
tutional purchasers. Even when the offering is a public one, most
of the purchasers are sophisticated institutional investors, which
are repeat players and interact with each other regularly. Some-
times as few as four institutions may hold the majority of the out-
standing class;48 other times, however, the number of owners will
range between fifty and one hundred, with no small group holding
a majority.
49
whether the company can keep pace with the high rate of technological change. In contrast,
customers of a railroad might see little reason to switch or might have little ability to do so.
' While the debtholders lose interest on their money, the equityholders extract what
amounts to an option on the firm: the equityholders generally lose little, if anything, if the
firm declines in value during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, but may reap
much of the benefit of any increase in value. The longer this "option" lasts, the more valua-
ble it is. Ex ante, any expected shift of value to equityholders must reduce the value of the
claim of the debtholders.
'I In Katz v Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A2d 873, 878 n 6 (Del Chanc 1986), four institu-
tions held 89% of the principal amount of one class of the outstanding notes. Four institu-
tions also held 85% in face amount of the two other classes of notes.
' See Playtex FP Group Inc., 1988 SEC No-Act LEXIS 1635, *2 (Dec 19) (between 59
and 66 beneficial holders held each of three classes of notes). Note, however, that concen-
trated ownership does not necessarily ensure collective action. Holdouts can act deceptively.
For example, some broker-dealer firms have advised their clients to tender into an issuer's
exchange offer, while holding out themselves. See Cowan, NY Times at D6 (cited in note 3)
(discussing allegations that R.D. Smith & Co. did this). Still, the number of recent exchange
offers that have been unsuccessful indicates that bondholders often can organize at least to
resist an exchange offer they consider inadequate.
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Even with concentrated ownership, collective action may still
fail. After all, collective action is not the only course of action open
to a bondholder that believes the exchange or tender offer pro-
posed by the issuer is inadequate. Rather, some sophisticated
bondholders may seek to strike a private deal with the issuer at a
higher price offered only to them; in fact, they may recognize that
the issuer could not afford to make a similar offer to all bondhold-
ers. These bondholders may defect from the coalition formed by
the other bondholders in one of two ways: (1) because of their
"blocking position" or nuisance value, they may demand a special
deal superior to that offered the others;50 or (2) they may hold out
when the others agree to tender because they realize that, once the
corporation's total liability is reduced by the exchange offer, it can
afford to pay off their bonds in full at maturity. The key point here
is that, although vulture funds can benefit other bondholders by
acquiring a blocking position that prevents a corporation from
overreaching its bondholders, they may simply use that position to
djvide with the corporation the gains that the latter could other-
wise have exacted from the public bondholders through a coercive
exchange offer. When vulture funds appear on the scene after a
debt exchange offer is announced and purchase debt securities
held by dispersed small bondholders, such a division may be occur-
ring (at least with respect to the difference between the trading
price and investment value on the bonds so purchased).
In this light, the premium over the exchange offer received by
such a bondholder may represent a wealth transfer from the other
bondholders. Moreover, not only do the defecting bondholder's
gains potentially come at the expense of the other bondholders,
but one bondholder's opportunistic behavior may dissuade the
other bondholders from engaging in collective action because they
fear they will be exploited by those that hold out or otherwise de-
fect from their coalition. Indeed, if some hold out and are paid in
full at maturity, those bondholders who accepted debt securities in
the exchange offer may face a new round of renegotiations and
5' These bondholders may be able to demand a special side deal because they hold a
"blocking position." Most bond indentures require a supermajority to amend the bond's
covenants. Corporate issuers can use the threat of amending the indenture to coerce the
bondholders into accepting an otherwise inadequate exchange offer. See notes 69-76 and
accompanying text. However, if a two-thirds vote (in face amount) of the bonds is required
to amend the indenture, then the holder or holders of just over one-third of the bonds (in
face amount) have blocking position and may demand a higher price for their securities
based on its possession. Because bondholders generally do not owe each other fiduciary du-
ties, they are under no obligation not to demand such a premium. Alternatively, some bond-
holders may simply have a special nuisance value because of their skill and experience in
bankruptcy negotiations and their record as persistent litigators.
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scaling down because the gains from collective action were lost. In
short, the pursuit of potentially zero-sum gains by some bondhold-
ers creates capital market uncertainty because it increases the risk
for all bondholders that they will not achieve a consensual solution
that averts otherwise unnecessary bankruptcy costs. In turn, this
uncertainty will cause bondholders to demand ex ante a higher
rate of return and therefore will force corporate issuers to pay a
higher cost of capital. At this point, the public policy justifications
for seeking to facilitate out-of-bankruptcy consensual renegotia-
tions expand beyond ensuring fairness to bondholders and involve
the overall efficiency of the capital market for debt. Ultimately,
any increase in the cost of capital because of the law's inability to
deter opportunistic behavior or to facilitate collective action repre-
sents a dead-weight social loss.
51
II. THE EXCHANGE OFFER WITH EXIT CONSENT AND THE
PRISONER'S DILEMMA
The exchange offer is the preferred technique of corporate
management to effect a recapitalization and avert insolvency.
52
The term "exchange offer" refers to an offer by a corporation, usu-
ally in the form of a tender offer, to exchange new securities for
existing securities.
Our focus is on offers to exchange new securities (mostly debt,
but sometimes with a cash component) for existing debt. Within
this context, one form of exchange offer has come to predominate:
an exchange offer conditioned on the bondholder's "exit consent."
To make a complying tender, the bondholder must execute a con-
sent form and deliver it to the offeror, authorizing the offeror to
vote the bonds in a manner prescribed by the offeror.
The exit consent relies on the provision found in most bond
indentures that permits a specified majority in principal amount of
the bondholders to amend the indenture." Although the Trust In-
denture Act of 1939 provides that bondholders may not alter cer-
51 It has been estimated that from 1980 to 1989, U.S. corporations raised $411 billion in
the equity markets, but $1.7 trillion in the bond markets. See Harry P. Kamen, Corporate
Responsibilities to Bondholders, in Sametz, ed, Institutional Investing 451 (cited in note 6).
Hence, practices that create unproductive uncertainty in a market of this size have consider-
able public policy significance.
"' See Salomon Brothers Study at I (cited in note 4) (31 exchange offers and 23'tender
offers announced during 1990 for high-yield debt securities).
" See American Bar Association, Business Law Section, Model Simplified Indenture,
38 Bus Law 741, 763 (1983) (Committee on Developments in Business Financing); American
Bar Foundation, Commentaries on Model Debenture Indentures 305 (1971).
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tain "core" provisions of publicly issued debt obligations, 54 bond-
holders can agree to eliminate other important protective
covenants-for example, covenants prohibiting the firm from pay-
ing dividends, covenants requiring the firm to maintain a specified
net worth, or covenants prohibiting the firm from incurring debt
senior in any respect in right of payment to the debt for which the
exchange offer is made.5
It is our thesis that the potential power of the corporate issuer
to strip the bonds of their protective covenants places the bond-
holders in a kind of prisoner's dilemma, which coerces the bond-
holders to accept an exchange offer they would not otherwise ac-
cept. 6 In Part A, we present the classic prisoner's dilemma. In
Part B, we demonstrate how exchange offers with exit consents
place debtholders in such a prisoner's dilemma.
' Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 316(b), codified at 15 USC § 77ppp(b) (1988) (prohib-
iting amendments of the provisions relating to interest, principal, and maturity). Such
prohibitions are also customary in debt issues not subject to the Trust Indenture Act. See
Kashner, 44 Bus Law at 124 (cited in note 24).
16 In addition, the indenture amendment may expressly subordinate the outstanding
class of debt to the new debt offered in the exchange, or it may increase the percentage vote
needed to accelerate the debt on default or decrease the vote necessary to make further
amendments of the indenture. In the case of secured bonds, an amendment may propose
releasing some or all of the collateral.
56 This problem of constrained choice is common to all tender offers, whether for stock
or bonds. See Lucian Arye Bebehuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and Proposed
Remedy, 12 Del J Corp Law 911, 922-25 (1987). Here, the distinctive fact is that bondhold-
ers must compare the consideration offered in the exchange or tender offer, not simply with
the expected value of the payments promised under the bond contract, but also with the
expected decrease in value due to "covenant-stripping" indenture amendments. Thus, there
are three values to be compared: (1) the offered exchange price, (2) the current value of the
bonds without amendment, and (3) the value of the "amended" bonds. A similar problem
can also arise when the firm is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. During such a proceed-
ing the debtor normally continues to manage the assets and has substantial control over the
formulation of a plan of reorganization and the treatment of particular creditors. See Ray-
mond T. Ninimer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and
New Value Contributions, 36 Emory L J 1009, 1017, 1026, 1036 (1987). The debtor can also
impose costs on others by delaying the proceedings or by forcing liquidation. Id at 1039.
Moreover, the court has the power to force creditors to accept a plan (under the
"cramdown" power). Id at 1037. These rules and realities lead to opportunities for the
debtor to play each class of creditors off the others.
Outsiders may also try to play the coercion game. For example, in In re Allegheny
International, Inc., 118 Bankr 282 (Bankr W D Pa 1990), Japonica Partners, a vulture fund,
sought to gain control of Allegheny International, Inc. after Allegheny had entered bank-
ruptcy. Japonica, which previously held no claims against Allegheny, bought sufficient
claims of certain classes of creditors to have the voting power to prevent adoption of the
debtor's plan. It then sought approval of its own plan. The court held that Japonica had
voted in bad faith and that, consequently, its votes should not be counted. Id at 290-91.
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A. The Classic Prisoner's Dilemma
In the classic prisoner's dilemma, two participants in a crimi-
nal act, whom we will call Amy and Bill, are arrested. They are
kept in separate rooms, unable to communicate with one another.
They are casual acquaintances, with no personal commitment to or
influence over one another. The police confront each of them with
the following alternatives: "(1) If one of you confesses and agrees
to testify as the state's witness, and the other does not, then the
one who confesses and testifies will go free and the other will go to
jail for twenty years. (2) If both of you confess and agree to testify,
both of you will go to jail for ten years. (3) If neither of you con-
fesses, we will get convictions against both of you for minor of-
fenses and both of you will go to jail for one year."
The following matrix reflects Amy's and Bill's options and
their consequences. Amy's punishment is first in the list of conse-





Bill's Confess 1 yr., 1 yr. 0, 20 yrs.
Choice
Confess 20 yrs., 0 10 yrs., 10 yrs.
If Amy rationally acts in her own self-interest, she will confess
and agree to testify. Her reasoning will be as follows: If Bill con-
fesses, Amy is better off if she also confesses, since she will serve
ten years in prison rather than twenty. If Bill does not confess,
Amy is again better off if she confesses, since she will then go free
instead of serving one year in prison. Thus, regardless of what Bill
does, Amy is better off if she confesses.
Obviously, the same is true for Bill, since he, by hypothesis,
has the same options as Amy. The result is that both will confess
and spend ten years in prison. But if they could have communi-
cated with each other and each have committed to refusing to con-
fess, their prison terms would have been only one year.
5
7
"' Amy and Bill could get one-year sentences, of course, if somehow they could have
agreed to cooperate in advance, with some effective means of enforcement. An important
characteristic of the hypothetical facts is that the "game" is a one-shot choice involving
people who are not able to communicate with one another. As discussed in Section H.B.3.,




In this classic form of the prisoner's dilemma, both Amy and
Bill have a dominant strategy, so there is a determinate outcome
(sometimes called a "Nash equilibrium"): confess, confess. In other
words, for each prisoner, the alternative of confessing dominates
the alternative of refusing to confess.
B. The Exchange Offer With Exit Consent
In the following sections, we demonstrate that the position of
each debenture holder confronted with either what we term a
"Form One Offer"(a conditional tender offer) or a "Form Two Of-
fer"(an offer with payment for consent) is analogous to that of
Amy or Bill. Each debenture holder faced with such an exchange
offer may accept it, even though they would all benefit by refusing
it.
1. The Form One Offer: conditional tender.
The defining feature of what we will call a "Form One Offer"
is that the consent and the tender are linked: To make a valid
tender, the bondholder must deliver an executed consent to the
indenture amendment proposed by the issuer.
To illustrate, assume that a corporation has $100 million in
face amount of subordinated debentures outstanding, with the
principal amount due ten years hence. The corporation offers to
pay cash equal to forty-five percent of the face amount of those
debentures tendered by bondholders within a specified period of
time. The corporation conditions the offer on the tender of at least
ninety-five percent of the principal amount of debentures out-
standing, that is, $95 million worth. The bondholders must accom-
pany their tenders with an executed consent to amend the inden-
ture to eliminate almost all of the significant protective
covenants-for example, including a covenant limiting the pay-
ment of dividends to shareholders and a covenant prohibiting the
firm from incurring debt senior to the debentures. 8
5 This version of a Form One Offer is similar to the offer of H C Crown Corp., for
debentures issued by Univision, Inc. Both H C Crown and Univision were wholly-owned
subsidiaries of Hallmark Cards, Inc. See Goldman, Sachs & Co., Offers to Purchase and
Consent Solicitations of Univision Holdings, Inc. by H C Crown Corp. (Feb 6, 1990) (on file
with U Chi L Rev). The offer was conditioned on a tender of 95% of the outstanding deben-
tures, but Hallmark later dropped that condition and accepted 93.3% ($251.9 million of a
total of $270 million). See Associated Press, Company News; Hallmark Accepts Univision
Offer, NY Times D3 (Apr 18, 1990). See also Merrill Lynch Capital Markets and Donaldson,
Lufkin, and Jenrette, The Southland Corporation Offers to Exchange and Solicitation of
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There are other common versions of the Form One Offer. In
one variation, the corporation offers to purchase fifty-one percent
of the principal amount of the outstanding debentures, with pro
rata acceptance if bondholders tender more than fifty-one per-
cent.5 9 In another variation, the corporation offers securi-
ties-either debt or common stock-instead of cash.6 0 For pur-
poses of our analysis, however, the possible variations are not
significant.
Suppose that you hold a debenture with a face amount of
$1000 that trades in a thin market. Right now you cannot find a
buyer at any price above $450. You have just received a Form One
Offer-a conditional tender offer-at $450. You think that the true
value of the debentures is $500 and that, before long, if you and
the other debenture holders reject the offer, the market price will
rise to that amount.6 This will not happen, of course, if a sufficient
Consents and Proxies (Aug 2, 1990) ("Southland Offering Circular") (on file with U Chi L
Rev). Southland offered mostly securities in exchange.
It may help the reader to refer to the generic matrix below as we go through various
hypothetical prisoner's dilemma matrices:
Your Choice
Don't Tender Tender
Don't Tender offer Tender offer
Sufficient Tender fails; you get fails; you get
Others' market price market price
Choice
Tender Tender offer suc- Tender offer
ceeds; you get succeeds; you
market price as get tender offer
influenced by the price
amendments
59 See description of tender offer by Community Newspapers, Inc., in text accompany-
ing notes 70-76.
10 See Katz, 508 A2d at 876.
61 Your rejection of the market's seemingly objective appraisal that the debenture is
worth $450 may be based simply on your own judgment of the debtor's prospects. To this
extent, you reject the market's efficiency for this security. The basis for your judgment may,
however, involve more complexity and uncertainty than is generally involved in determining
value. Debt exchange offers often occur when the corporation is in financial trouble. The
corporation may need additional equity capital and the value of the debentures may depend
on how much dilution the existing equityholders are willing to accept. See text accompany-
ing notes 92-94. Moreover, the issuer of the debt may be on the verge of bankruptcy, or,
short of that, reaching a position where goodwill and other operating values or strategic
advantages are lost. Full information about the financial condition of the issuer is likely to
be hard to come by. Current investors may be willing to hold on and hope for the best, while
new investors may be reluctant to take the risk inherent in the debt.
Other considerations also lend plausibility to a theory of inaccurate, or seemingly inac-
curate, market prices. The value of a bond in a workout context may be significantly related
to its holder's ability to negotiate. Small holders will usually not invest time or money in
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number of holders accept the $450 offer. However, suppose that
you also believe that the existing bonds, without their important
protective covenants, will be worth only $400. Finally, suppose that
you do not hold enough debentures to affect the outcome of the
tender offer.
In these circumstances, you will tender. Your reasoning will
parallel that of each prisoner in the prisoner's dilemma: if the
tender offer fails, you will get $500, regardless of whether you
tender or not. But if the tender offer succeeds and you fail to






Others' Tender $500 $500
Choice
Tender $400 $450
Thus, you will maximize your expected wealth if you tender.6 2
All other debtholders will reason the same way and all will tender.
The offer will succeed, and the bonds will be worth $450. But
again, if the bondholders could have cooperated and agreed not to
tender, the bonds would have been worth $500.3
extended negotiations, but larger holders (including the new vulture funds) can and do.
Thus, an arbitrage process, in which some holders assemble larger positions that may give
them a blocking position or that justify expenditures on negotiation and litigation, may re-
sult. This arbitrage process may also move the bonds from risk averse holders to risk neutral
ones (who will reject a price that a risk averse holder may consider adequate).
We do know, in any event, that Form One Offers have been rejected when holders have
been able to communicate with one another effectively. See text accompanying notes 70-76.
In the case of the Southland offer, for example, the recent high market price for the senior
debentures had been $490. See Southland Offering Circular at 150 (cited in note 58). The
issuer originally made an offer that was estimated at $350, and was described by one busi-
ness writer as a "raw deal." Schifrin, Enough Already! Forbes at 130 (cited in note 20). The
offer was later improved to a package consisting of $57 cash, plus 86.5 shares of common
stock (presumably worth $1.50 per share, the price to be paid for such shares by a new
investor), plus $475 in face amount of new 12% debt obligations. See Southland Offering
Circular at 10 (cited in note 58). All the proposed exchange offers were rejected by South-
land's creditors and eventually Southland was reorganized through a prepackaged
bankruptcy.
62 This result holds regardless of the probability you assign to the success of the offer.
To state the reasoning differently, there is no circumstance in which you are worse off by
tendering. There is, however, a circumstance in which you are worse off by not tendering. if
a sufficient number of others tender and the offer is successful.
13 The above analysis may make the Form One Offer seem pernicious to debenture-
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2. Form Two Offer: Offer with payment for consent.
In the Form Two Offer, the corporate issuer partially sepa-
rates the tender from the consent by paying for the consent
separately.
For example, the issuer may offer to buy thirty percent of the
outstanding principal amount of its debentures for $600 per $1,000
face amount of debenture. In addition, the issuer may offer to pay
a premium of $17.50 per $1,000 debenture for a consent to amend
the indenture to eliminate important protective covenants. The is-
suer conditions the entire offer on receiving sufficient consents to
amend the indenture. The issuer pays the consent fee to all those
who tender with consent, despite proration of purchases.6 4 Such
"vote buying" has become common in debt tender offers. 5
Suppose that you hold a debenture with a face amount of
$1,000, a favorable interest rate, and a maturity date ten years
hence. The recent market price has been $1,080. The market is
thin, however, and you think that the debenture's value is $1,100.
The issuer offers to redeem thirty percent of the outstanding de-
bentures at a price of $1,070. The issuer also offers to pay $17.50
per debenture for an exit consent to amend the indenture to elimi-
nate a covenant that prohibits the payment of dividends to share-
holders (for example, because the corporation has not achieved
sufficient earnings). The corporate issuer seeks the amendment in
order to pay its customary quarterly dividend.66 Suppose further
holders. That appearance may be misleading. The hypothetical facts above dramatize the
coercive aspect of such offers. In other settings coercion may serve a benign purpose, as we
will explain later. See text accompanying notes 77-101. This benign use of coercion may be
why Chancellor Allen, in Katz, objected to the use of the word "coercion" at all. 508 A2d at
879-80. We will suggest, however, that the benign purpose can be achieved without coercion,
while the pernicious purpose cannot. That is why we ultimately conclude that the tender
offer with exit consent should not be tolerated. See text at beginning of Section IV.
See Offering Circular of Armco Inc. (Aug 1, 1990) and Supplemental Offer (Sept 13,
1990), in Wall St J C17 (Sept 14, 1990). Armco offered $1,070, a small premium over the
face amount of its bond. The purpose of the Armco offer was to allow it to pay a modest
dividend. The debentures had traded in January 1990 for $107.88. See 57 Moody's Bond
Record 11 (No 1, Jan 1990).
"' For example, during 1990, Mary Kay Corp. offered to pay $10 in cash for each $1,000
principal amount of debentures to holders that consented to the elimination of certain re-
strictive covenants. Salomon Brothers Study at 10 (cited in note 4). Similarly, Armco, Inc.
offered to pay a $17.50 fee for each $1,000 principal amount to holders of its senior notes
that voted to relax a dividend test in its indenture. Id at 12. The highest consent fee we
have come across was offered by Holiday Inns, Inc., which offered to pay $110 per each
$1,000 principal amount of its notes in return for consent to indenture amendments. Id at
18. This amounts to 10% of the total value of the transaction (i.e., tender price plus consent
fee). More commonly, the fee is in the 1% to 2% range.
06 This was the objective of the exchange offer by Armco described in note 64.
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that, in your belief, the bonds will only be worth $1,040 in the mar-
ket absent this protective covenant. The issuer conditions the en-
tire offer on receiving exit consents representing 50.1 percent of
the total principal amount, a number adequate to approve the
amendment.
If you are a debenture holder calculating the value of your al-
ternatives, you must initially estimate the effect of proration. Sup-
pose that you think that ninety percent of the debentures will be
tendered and that, consequently, one-third6 7 of the debentures you
tender will be redeemed for $1,070. Suppose that you have three
debentures and tender all of them. You will receive $1,070 for one
of the debentures, plus the $17.50 consent fee for each of them, or
$52.50. You will receive cash of $1,122.50, and two of your deben-
tures will be returned to you. Again, you think that those two de-
bentures, after the amendment to the indenture, will be worth
$1,040 each, or a total of $2,080. Thus your expected wealth if the
tender is successful and you tender is $3,202.50. Your decision ma-





Others' Tender $3,300 $3,300
Choice
Tender $3,120 $3,202.50
If sufficient others (50.1 percent) do not tender, your bonds
will be worth $3,300, regardless of whether you tender or not. But
if sufficient others do tender, you will receive $3,202.50 if you
tender and only $3,120 if you do not. So you tender. But, once
again, if the current value of the debentures is in fact $3,300-as
you believe it is-you would be better off if the tender were unsuc-
cessful. Yet, unless you can reach an agreement with enough other
bondholders, you will tender. You are again caught in a prisoner's
dilemma.
6 8
67 Or 30% (percentage of outstanding debentures to be redeemed) divided by 90%
(percentage of debentures tendered).
68 Of course, you may be wrong about the value of the debentures: they may only be
worth $1,060 each. In that case, you and the other holders would be better off if the tender
offer were to succeed. Our point, however, is that, even if a majority of the holders think
that the debentures are worth $1,100, and that the offer is not in their best interests, the
offer may still succeed.
1991] 1231
The University of Chicago Law Review
3. A real-world example of the prisoner's dilemma.
The prisoner's dilemma posed by the hypotheticals above can
easily occur in the real world. Suppose that a corporation is in
some financial difficulty and that as a result its debentures are sell-
ing at a discount in a thin market. Partly because of rumors of
impending bankruptcy proceedings, which the corporation has
done nothing to dispel, debenture holders may be unable to find
buyers at a reasonable price. Also suppose that the corporation has
not released enough financial data to allow investors to arrive at
sound valuations of their claims.6 9 At this point, the corporation
makes a cash tender offer for the debentures at a low price, requir-
ing that the bondholders include exit consents with their tenders
and contingent upon the corporation receiving enough consents to
amend the indenture to remove all significant financial covenants.
The corporation announces that, if the offer is successful and the
indenture is amended, it intends to incur new debt that is senior to
the existing debentures.
This scenario closely resembles the 1990 tender offer made by
Community Newspapers, Inc. (CNI). 0 CNI was headed by Ralph
Ingersoll, who owned half of the equity. The other half was owned
by the venture capital firm of E.M. Warburg, Pincus & Company.
The interest rate on the Community Newspaper obligations was
scheduled to be reset on July 7, 1990 at a rate sufficient to make
them trade at par, but apparently there was no interest rate high
enough to accomplish that objective.
71
Ingersoll, through his firm, Ingersoll Newspapers, Inc. (INI),
offered to buy eighty percent of CNI's Senior Subordinated Reset
Notes at fifty-five percent of their face amount. Ingersoll also of-
fered to buy fifty-one percent of CNI's Subordinated Discount De-
bentures at twenty-five percent of their face amount, contingent
upon the bondholders' consent to strip both issues of all of their
"' There is widespread discontent among debtholders about the inadequacy of the in-
formation they are able to obtain. See Colloton, Bondholder Communications-The Miss-
ing Link in High Yield Debt at 34-40 (cited in note 31).
70 See Goldman, Sachs & Co., Offers to Purchase and Consent Solicitations of Commu-
nity Newspapers, Inc., by Ingersoll Newspapers, Inc. (Mar 22, 1990) ("CNI Offering Circu-
lar") (on file with U Chi L Rev). The background of the CNI offer is described in Benjamin
J. Stein, Insult to Injury: Junk Holders Get Offers They Should, But Can't, Refuse, Bar-
ron's 42 (May 28, 1990).
71 See CNI Offering Circular at 10 (cited in note 70). The problem with the reset provi-
sion is in part that as the rate is raised, the increased interest burden increases the risk of
default. See William A. Klein and John C. Coffee, Jr., Business Organization and Finance
335-38 (Foundation Press, 4th ed 1990).
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significant protective covenants. 72 Among other objectives, this
stripping would have permitted Ingersoll to subordinate the debt
to other debt. Ingersoll would then have financed the buy-back by
issuing new debt senior to the existing debt.73 Ingersoll claimed
that he was bestowing a benefit on the debtholders, some of whom,
he claimed, had asked to be bought out.
One analyst claimed that the true value of the senior deben-
tures was eighty percent of their face amount.7 4 One investor called
the offer "insulting," and the bondholders twice rejected it.75 Ulti-
mately, Ingersoll withdrew his offer and swapped with E.M.
Warburg, Pincus, so that it became the sole owner of CNI.76 Ap-
parently, the bondholders, which were mostly institutions, were
few enough that they could communicate their dissatisfaction to
each other. Hence they were able to act collectively, avoid the pris-
oner's dilemma, and reject the offer.
III. VULTURE FUNDS AND THE HOLDOUT PROBLEM
The preceding discussion suggests a simple policy reform: cur-
tail coercion by making it more difficult to amend the indenture, at
least in the case of issuer-proposed exchange or tender offers. But
this reform ignores the problem of the opportunistic holdout. Ulti-
mately, eliminating all elements of coercion from the recapitaliza-
tion context would also disarm the ability of the majority of the
bondholders to discipline holdouts, and would thereby expose
them to greater uncertainty. In the last analysis, unproductive un-
certainty is the enemy of both most bondholders and the corporate
issuer because it raises the cost of capital, while benefiting only
those few bondholders whose strategic positions or special exper-
tise allows them to exploit and profit from it.
7' See CNI Offering Circular at 1-2 (cited in note 70).
73 Id.
7' See Eric N. Berg, Ingersoll Scrambles to Avoid Default, NY Times D1, D2 (Mar 23,
1990).
7' Beth Selby, Bondholders Rebel Against Ingersoll Newspapers, Institutional Investor
23 (Jun 1990). Another newspaper account cited Ingersoll's offer as an "egregious example"
of exchange offers being used "abusively," in reliance in part on the bankruptcy laws,
"which allow owners to operate and retain control of failed companies during lengthy peri-
ods of 'reorganization,'" and which "give considerable latitude to unscrupulous bond issuers
immune to the stigma of default." Larry Black, View from New York: Drexel Paves the
Way for a Comeback, Independent 25 (Jun 4, 1990).
7' See Alex S. Jones, Ingersoll, in Swap, Sheds His U.S. Papers, NY Times D1 (Jul 3,
1990). Warburg, Pincus ultimately offered to redeem the bonds for 74 cents on the dollar,
but a substantial holder held out, the offer failed, and the company was forced into bank-
ruptcy. See Cowan, NY Times at C1 (cited in note 3); Linda Sandler, Battles on Two Junk
Bond Fronts: Offer by Chain of Newspapers Is Threatened, Wall St J C1 (Jan 28, 1991).
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To understand these contentions, it is useful to begin by un-
derstanding how it might be in the debtholders' interest to reduce
their claims. For example, reducing the outstanding debt may in-
duce equityholders to invest new money in the firm. This addi-
tional capital may finance a profitable venture or stave off bank-
ruptcy, benefiting both debtholders and equityholders. In such
settings, coercive exchange offers can solve a holdout problem
among the debtholders and facilitate the beneficial transaction.
The following subsections present two such settings: (1) when a
firm needs capital to finance a profitable project, and (2) when a
firm needs capital to avoid insolvency.
A. Financing a Profitable Project
Professor Stewart Myers has identified a situation in which
the value of a firm-and the value of the debt and equity claims-
can be maximized only if the debtholders agree to scale back their
claims.7 7 That circumstance can best be described by hypothetical
facts.
78
Suppose that X Corp. begins in Year 1 with assets of $2,000,
debt of $1,000, and equity (common stock) of $1,000. The debt
bears a market rate of interest and is due at the end of Year 20.
The firm's initial financial status is shown in Balance Sheet A:
Balance Sheet A
Assets Liability and Equity
Book Mkt Book Mkt
Investments $2,000 $2,000 Debt $1,000 $1,000
Equity 1,000 1,000
Over the next ten years, the firm does poorly. At the end of
Year 10, the firm's assets carry a book value of $1,200, but have a
market value of only $800. 79 In other words, the firm has shown
7 Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J Fin Econ 147, 158
(1977).
"I This analysis is taken, with minor changes, from Klein and Coffee, Business Organi-
zation and Finance at 237-40 (cited in note 71). We are grateful to The Foundation Press,
Inc., holder of the copyright, for permission to use this material. See also William Klein,
The Put-Up-Or-Shut-Up Strategy in Business Negotiations, 17 U Cal Davis L Rev 341,
342-,51 (1983) (similar problem in context of real estate limited partnership).
79 The analysis does not depend on the bonds selling for less than face amount, though
it does depend on the bonds having some significant risk of default. If the bonds do have a
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losses of $800 on its books (the decline from $2,000 to $1,200), but
in fact has sustained an additional, unrealized, loss of $400. Bal-
ance Sheet B shows the firm's financial status after ten years:
Balance Sheet B
Assets Liability and Equity
Book Mkt Book Mkt
Investments $1,200 $800 Debt $1,000 $700
Equity 200 100
Assume further that the firm has paid the interest on the
debt, and that the debt is not in default.8 0 Assume that the sole
reason why the debt is worth $300 less than its face amount is de-
fault risk; the market rate of interest has not changed.8' While the
claim of the debt exceeds the value of the firm, the equity "cap-
tures" some of the firm's value: the equity is like an option to buy
the firm from the bondholders for $1,000 any time within the next
ten years, subject to an obligation to make interest payments to
keep the option in effect.8 2 This option has value even though, if
the firm were liquidated correctly, the equity would receive
nothing.
Suppose that X Corp.'s managers become aware of an oppor-
tunity to invest in a project with a cost of $550 and an estimated
present value of $800. Only this firm can develop the project; it
market value equal to or greater than par, however, the underinvestment problem discussed
in the text may be avoidable by redeeming them under an optional redemption right (a call
provision).
30 If the indenture contained a covenant requiring the firm to maintain an equity cush-
ion of, say, at least half the amount of the debt, then the firm would be in default, and, most
likely, the full amount of the debt would become due and payable. The firm presumably
could not pay and could be forced into bankruptcy.
hi The following assumptions illustrate how the relative values of the debt ($700) and
equity ($100) might arise:
---- Outcome ...... Value-------
Probability Firm Debt Equity Firm Debt Equity
0.1 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0
0.8 750 750 0 600 600 0
0.1 2,000 1,000 1,000 200 100 100
Total $800 $700 $100
82 See Klein and Coffee, Business Organization and Finance at 44-47, 271-75 (cited in
note 71).
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cannot be sold.83 Suppose further that the project has a zero vari-
ance of expected returns84 and must be financed with new equity.
One financing option is a rights offering:85 by setting the price
low enough, the firm's management could force the existing share-
holders to subscribe to the offering because otherwise the propor-
tionate interest of non-subscribing shareholders would be diluted.
In effect, these shareholders would transfer wealth to those who
did subscribe.8 6 If this subscription approach were used, the book
value of the firm's assets would increase by the $550 contribution
to $1,750, and the market value would increase by the $800 value
of the project to $1,600. However, the market value of the debt
would also increase by $300, because, with the value added by the
new project, there would no longer be any risk of default. Thus,
the equity would increase in value by only $500. Balance Sheet C
shows the post-offering results:
Balance Sheet C
Assets Liability and Equity
Book Mkt Book Mkt
Investments $1,750 $1,600 Debt $1,000 $1,000
Equity 750 600
In short, the project would increase the value of the firm by
$250-the difference between the increased value of the firm and
its securities ($800), and the cost of producing that increase (that
is, the amount of the additional equity investment, $550). If, how-
The project might, for example, be to repair or improve the firm's existing plant.
In other words, it is a sure thing. This assumption simplifies the explanation but its
rejection would not affect the basic analysis. Implicit in the numbers used in the example in
the text is the assumption that the existing investment has some variance in expected out-
comes. See note 81. If the new project does have some variance in expected outcomes, that
variance may be either positively or negatively correlated with the variance of the existing
investment. If the correlation is negative, the combined variance is reduced, which will tend
to benefit the debt at the expense of the equity, magnifying the conflict discussed in the
text. If the correlation is positive, the combined variance is magnified, which will benefit the
equity. In fact, if the variance of the new project is the same as, and perfectly correlated
with, the variance of the existing project hypothesized in note 81, it turns out that once the
new project is added, the value of the bonds is $900 and the value of the equity is $700.
With these numbers, the problem presented in the text disappears. It is certainly possible,
however, to hypothesize numbers for which the problem does not disappear, even with a
positive correlation.
81 In a rights offering, the corporation issues to its shareholders the right to subscribe to
its shares for a limited period at a price below their current market value. The shareholders
thus receive a bargain, while the issuer saves the standard underwriters' discount. See Klein




ever, the managers seek to maximize shareholder wealth, they will
in fact reject the project because it would decrease shareholder
wealth by $50 (the post-investment value of the common stock
($600), less the additional equity cost ($550), less the pre-invest-
ment value of the common stock ($100)).87 In other words, the pro-
ject increases the firm's value by $250, but the infusion of new eq-
uity shifts $300 of firm wealth to the bondholders. 8 Other have
referred to this phenomenon as a "buoying-up" of the debt. 9
Note that the conflict between the equity and the debt de-
pends upon the duration of the debt. If the debt were due soon,
the common shareholders could not pay it and the debt would be
in default. If the bankruptcy procedure operated quickly, without
cost, and with a rule of absolute priority, the bondholders would
take over the assets of the firm, including the new business oppor-
tunity. Thus the bondholders would undertake the new project,
and the firm would be worth $1,050.90 In fact, even if the debt were
due and in default, the firm's managers probably could file for pro-
tection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.9 1 This would
carry with it the threat of delay and the corresponding threat of
losing the value of the prospect. The result would be that the
shareholders would be required to share the $250 potential gain
with the bondholders; otherwise, the bondholders would carry out
their threat and the gain would be lost.
One means by which bondholders and shareholders could
share the potential gain would be for the bondholders to agree to
reduce their claims, for example, to $800. The effect would be to
97 The same result obtains if the new equity is raised by issuing new shares to outsid-
ers. For their $550 contribution, the outsiders would, of course, demand shares worth $550.
Since the total equity would be worth $600, that would leave the original shareholders with
shares worth only $50, or $50 less than what they started with. This observation leads to the
further observation that the bondholders would be protected by a covenant requiring the
firm to maintain an equity cushion of, say, $750, and explicitly requiring that the firm raise
new equity capital if necessary to comply with that requirement. Merely treating the failure
to maintain the specified equity cushion as an act of default may have much the same effect.
86 As indicated in note 84, if the new project has a variance identical to and positively
correlated with the variance hypothesized in note 81, the value of the bonds will be $900
and the value of the equity will be $700. In this situation, the contribution of an additional
$550 in equity results in an increase in the value of the equity of $600 (to $700 from $100),
so the investment presumably will be made.
89 See Roe, 97 Yale L J at 233 n 3 (cited in note 24).
90 Note that with the firm worth $1,050, and bondholders' claims of $1,000, the common
shareholders would be entitled to securities worth $50. This observation helps explain why a
firm may be worth more after insolvency reorganization than before and why, as a result,
the common shareholders may be entitled to some of the shares of the reorganized firm even
though, before the reorganization, its liabilities exceeded its assets.
91 11 USC § 1101 et seq (1988).
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increase the value of the debt by $100 from its initial value of $700.
At the same time, the value of the equity would rise to $800. In
other words, because the market value of the debt and equity
claims together were $1,600, the reduction of the debt claims from
$1,000 to $800 would increase the market value of the equity
claims from $600 to $800. By investing $550, the equityholders
would increase the value of their equity from $100 to $800, for a
net gain of $150 ($800, less the $550 of additional equity, less the
$100 pre-investment value). Thus, the equityholders would have a
strong incentive to contribute the additional capital, and the
debtholders would have a strong incentive to accept a reduction in
the amount of their claim.
Suppose all the bondholders see that it is in their best inter-
ests to accept a reduced claim, or "haircut." Suppose that the cor-
poration has made an exchange offer under which each $1,000 (face
amount) bond would be exchanged for a new $800 bond. If a bond-
holder confronted with this offer were to hold out, and enough
other bondholders were to tender, the exchange would succeed and
the bondholder would still hold a $1,000 bond. Conversely, if
enough bondholders were also to hold out, the exchange would not
succeed and everyone would lose.9 2 Again, what seems individually
rational is not collectively rational.
Still, bondholders can achieve what is collectively rational for
them by devising a means to preclude holding out. As already
noted, adding an exit consent to the exchange offer can reduce the
incentive to hold out. 3 But this technique will not always be effec-
tive as a coercive device. It has the intended coercive effect only
where stripping the covenants makes the existing obligations of the
firm worth less than the new obligations offered in the exchange.
For example, a corporation might offer new obligations worth $800.
But if the existing obligations, with a face amount of $1,000, were
worth more than $800, even without their protective covenants,
and even with the existing obligations subordinated to the new,
94
the holdout problem would remain.
92 For a real-world version of this holdout problem, see Floyd Norris, Lindner Promise:
A Delicate Game, NY Times D8 (Jun 27, 1990).
"Where the bonds are not publicly held, the indenture could allow amendment by
majority (or some higher percentage) vote to reduce the claim. That is a simple way to solve
the holdout problem. But, as stated earlier, in the case of publicly issued bonds, amendment
of core provisions is not permitted. See text accompanying notes 53-56.
" This could be the case if the exchange offer is successful, new equity capital is in-
vested, and the existing debt is buoyed up. It could also happen if the maturity date on the
existing debt is fast approaching.
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Even if the bondholders were prepared to reduce their claims,
they would still need to agree with the equityholders over how to
divide the $250 increase in the firm's value. The outcome of the
bargaining process is indeterminate. The result may be an impasse,
as the two sets of claimants match their collective risk aversion,
greed, and resolve. Economists refer to this scenario as a "bilateral
monopoly" problem. The exchange offer with exit consent may
solve the bilateral monopoly problem, but this solution gives the
equityholders the unilateral power to decide how to divide the
gain.
In some circumstances the firm can raise additional capital,
without either buoying up the existing debt or reducing the value
of the equity, by issuing senior debt.9 5 For example, on the above
facts, both the existing debtholders and the existing equityholders
would be better off if the firm were to issue new senior debt to
finance the project.96 Of course, if the terms of the existing debt
prohibit subordination, the debtholders would have to vote to ap-
" Ideally, the new debt should have a senior claim only on the new project. See Elazar
Berkovitch and E. Han Kim, Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced Over- and
Under-Investment Incentives, 45 J Fin 765, 766 (1990).
96 Return to the distribution of expected outcomes hypothesized in note 81. Assuming
that the new project is worth $800, with zero variance, the new distribution of outcomes and
resulting values is as follows (with the total debt claim now $1,550):
------ Outcome ...... Value -------
Probability Firm Debt Equity Firm Debt Equity
0.1 $800 $800 $ 0 $80 $80 $ 0
0.8 1,550 1,550 0 1,240 1,240 0
0.1 2,800 1,550 1,250 280 155 125
Total $1,600 $1,475 $125
Of the total value of $1,475 for the debt, $550 is allocable to the new senior debt and
the remaining $925 is allocable to the existing, now subordinated debt. Thus, the existing
debtholders gain $225, while the equityholders gain $25. The equityholders might demand a
larger share of the gain and might, therefore, use an exchange offer with exit consent to
require the existing debtholders to accept a reduced claim.
It is possible, of course, that the new project might reduce the variance of outcomes.
Suppose, for example, that with the new project completed the expected outcomes and val-
ues are as follows:
- Outcome ...... Value-------
Probability Firm Debt Equity Firm Debt Equity
0.1 $1,100 $1,100 $ 0 $110 $110 $ 0
0.8 1,550 1,550 0 1,240 1,240 0
0.1 2,500 1,550 950 250 155 95
Total $1,600 $1,505 $ 95
In this situation, the issuance of subordinated debt reduces the value of the equity from
$100 to $95 and presumably a reduction of the claim of the existing debt would become a
non-negotiable demand of the equityholders.
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prove an amendment of the indenture permitting the senior debt
issuance.
Issuing senior debt avoids the holdout problem, but it does not
solve the bilateral monopoly problem; the possibility of a mutually
destructive impasse remains.9 7
B. Avoiding Insolvency
The preceding analysis of the buoying-up phenomenon is also
applicable to a firm that is on the verge of bankruptcy and needs
97 There is a similar situation in which it may be in the best interests of the
debtholders to scale back their claims: when equity will be taken out of the corporation. See
Klein and Coffee, Business Organization and Finance at 243-44 (cited in note 71). Imagine
a firm whose financial condition is reflected in Balance Sheet D:
Balance Sheet D
Assets Liability and Equity
Book Mkt Book Mkt
Assets $1,750 $1,350 Debt $1,000 $1,000
Equity 750 350
Suppose that the assets include $550 in cash and that distribution of this cash to sharehold-
ers as a dividend is not prohibited by the terms of the loan agreement, by the corporate-law
rules relating to dividends, see Bayless Manning and James J. Hanks, Jr., Legal Capital
(Foundation Press, 1990); Klein and Coffee, Business Organization and Finance at 197-99
(cited in note 71), or by rules relating to fraudulent conveyances, see Robert Clark, Corpo-
rate Law 40-52 (Little Brown, 1986). Suppose further that if the cash is retained it can be
invested in a project that will increase the firm's value by $800. If the cash is distributed the
results are as reflected in Balance Sheet E:
Balanca Sheet E
Assets Liability and Equity
Book Mkt Book Mkt
Assets $1,200 $800 Debt $1,000 $700
Equity 200 100
The wealth of the debtholders will decline from $1,000 to $700. The value of the share-
holders' equity will decline from $350 to $100, but they will have the $550 in cash, so their
total wealth will be $650. The debtholders' $300 loss is the equityholders' $300 gain. But
now the firm will pass up a project that would increase its value by $250. Payment of a
dividend as large as $550 may seem unrealistic, but smaller dividends paid regularly over
time could have the same effect. The profitable project might not be a single investment (for
example, rehabilitating a hotel), but rather, periodic investments in maintenance and repair.
Lastly, suppose the debtholders were willing to reduce their claims to $800 if the equi-
tyholders agreed to forgo the dividend and invest in the project. The results are those re-
flected in Balance Sheet F:
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new capital.98
To illustrate, return to Balance Sheet B and assume that it
represents the outcome if the firm enters bankruptcy. The claim of
the debt exceeds the market value of the assets, but the equity still
has some value because of its blocking or "holdup" power-that is,
its power to delay restructuring and rehabilitation.99 If the firm
can raise new money and avoid bankruptcy, the outcome is Bal-
ance Sheet C. The "project" that generates an additional $250 is
simply the avoidance of the costs of bankruptcy. This "project" is
an example of a "workout" designed to stave off bankruptcy. But
workouts require haircuts, giving rise to the holdout problem. Once
again, an exchange offer with exit consent can solve this holdout
problem, but it remains subject to the possibility of a bilateral mo-
nopoly impasse.
C. A Real-World Example of Beneficial Coercion
To demonstrate the reality of the above analysis, consider the
facts in the leading case on the use of exit consents, Katz v Oak
Industries Inc.100 The court observed that Oak Industries was "in
Balance Sheet F
Assets Liability and Equity
Book Mkt Book Mkt
Assets $1,750 $1,600 Debt $1,000 $ 800
Equity 750 800
The equityholders will be better off than they would be if they paid themselves a divi-
dend. But the debtholders will also be better off. Their claims will be worth $800 instead of
the $700 they would be worth in the absence of agreement.
Once more we see a situation in which it is in the interest of debtholders to scale back
their claims. And once again, unless the holdout problem can be solved, that result may not
be achievable.
18 Professor Roe also discusses the holdout problem in situations in which new capital
is not needed but the debtholders must scale back their claims in order to avoid the costs
and losses associated with bankruptcy. See Roe, 97 Yale L J 232 (cited in note 24). Professor
Roe anticipates many of the observations and much of the analysis in this Article. His per-
spective differs from ours, however, and we add some qualifications to his analysis.
" See Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute
Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 Emory L J 1009 (1987). "[A]s a general matter,
bankruptcy law substitutes a theme of debtor protection for a state law theme of creditor
dominance in debt collection matters." Id at 1082. See also Kashner, 44 Bus Law 123 (cited
in note 24).
10 508 A2d 873. A more recent illustration is found in the attempted recapitalization of
The Southland Corporation. See note 58. Southland was on the verge of bankruptcy. Ito-
Yokado, a Japanese firm that had brought Southland's 7-Eleven stores to Japan, had agreed
to invest $430 million in return for 70% of Southland's common stock, but the investment
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deep trouble," having experienced "unremitting losses" for the
previous forty-five months.10 1 The price of the common stock had
fallen from $30 to $2 per share and the debt was trading at "sub-
stantial discounts."'12 Oak plainly needed an infusion of equity
capital, and reached an agreement with Allied-Signal, Inc., under
which Allied-Signal would buy part of the Oak assets for $160 mil-
lion in cash and would invest an additional $15 million in Oak's
common stock and warrants. Allied-Signal conditioned these in-
vestments on the bondholders tendering a certain minimum
amount of the debt into an exchange offer by Oak. Under the ex-
change offer, Oak would pay cash, varying in amounts from $918 to
$665 per debenture for various classes of debt. These amounts "ap-
pear[ed] to represent a premium over the market prices for [Oak's]
debentures as of the time the terms of the transaction were set.'1
0 3
The bondholders were to accompany their tenders with exit con-
sents for amendments eliminating several protections in the origi-
nal indenture, including "all financial covenants."'10 4 Without the
amendments, Allied-Signal was unwilling to make either the $15
million equity investment or the $160 million purchase of assets.
In short, in the circumstances described by the court, it ap-
pears that the corporation needed new equity to preserve the re-
maining value of the firm, that the investment of the new equity
was contingent on a reduction of the debt claims, and that the cor-
poration used exit consents to induce debtholders to accept a deal
that was in their best interests.
IV. THE FORM THREE OFFER AND PREPACKAGED BANKRUPTCY:
SOLUTIONS TO THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA AND HOLDOUT PROBLEMS
Most exchange offers are neither purely benign, designed to
solve the holdout problem in the presence of a need for additional
capital, nor purely pernicious, designed to victimize debtholders by
foisting upon them obligations worth less than the current value of
their claims. Instead, many such offers are "hybrids," designed to
serve both objectives.
For example, consider a corporation in financial trouble and in
need of new capital. A reduction in the claims of the debtholders
was contingent on scaling back the debt. See Matthew Schifrin, Bondholders Fight Back,
Forbes 10 (Aug 20, 1990) (focusing on how the debtholders had held out for a better deal
than was initially offered).
101 Katz, 508 A2d at 875.
101 Id at 875 n 2.




may be essential to the creation or preservation of value for the
firm. In this setting, however, the equityholders (represented by
incumbent management), may take advantage of the need for re-
capitalization by offering the debtholders too little. The "too little"
may be blatant-an amount, for example, that is less than the
value of the debt in bankruptcy., Or it may simply be an inade-
quate share of the gains from cooperation. In this situation, the
exchange offer may serve a benign purpose in maximizing the value
of the firm, but it may nonetheless be an offer that the debtholders
would refuse if presented with an unconstrained choice.
Thus, our goal is to devise a regime that will both prevent cor-
porate issuers from coercing the bondholders to accept unfavorable
restructurings and at the same time allow bondholders to scale
back their claims when it would benefit them. In Part A, we pre-
sent a third kind of exchange offer with exit consent: the Form
Three Offer, in which the corporate issuer conditions the offer on
the prior vote by the bondholders to approve an amendment of the
indenture agreement. It is our thesis that the Form Three Offer
will eliminate the prisoner's dilemma problem, so that the bond-
holders will be free to accept beneficial restructurings and reject
unfavorable restructurings.
Even if the Form Three Offer is superior to the Form One and
Form Two Offers, it is not necessarily the best solution to collec-
tive action problems in corporate workouts and reorganizations.
Bankruptcy law similarly has been viewed as providing a solution
to such collective action problems,105 and recently the prepackaged
bankruptcy plan has emerged as an alternative mechanism for
avoiding the holdout problem aggravated by the rise of the vulture
fund. Part B contrasts and compares the Form Three Offer with
the prepackaged bankruptcy plan and concludes that neither is a
complete substitute for the other. At the very least, however, the
availability of both of these less coercive options undercuts any
justification for Form One or Form Two Offers.
A. Form Three Offer: Offer Conditioned on Vote
We call our proposed solution the Form Three Offer. In a
Form Three Offer, unlike the Form One and Form Two Offers, the
105 See, for example, Douglas G. Baird and Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative
Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J Legal Stud 311 (1991) (arguing that
the traditional approach to bankruptcy law neglects some of the important effects of the
law).
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consent must precede the tender offer. The essential feature of a
Form Three Offer is that a bondholder has the right to vote
against the amendment without sacrificing the right to exchange if
the majority (in interest) of the bondholders approves the amend-
ment. Unlike the Form One and Form Two Offers, the Form Three
Offer does not appear to be in use today.
For example, the corporation might offer to buy back all of its
debentures for a package of cash and securities worth sixty percent
of the principal amount. The corporation would condition the offer
on a prior vote of the debenture holders to eliminate important
protective covenants. If the debenture holders were to vote to elim-
inate the covenants, the offer to purchase would become irrevoca-
ble and unconditional. But if the debenture holders were not to
agree to eliminate the covenants, the offer would be canceled. It is
vital that an individual bondholder could vote against stripping
the covenants and subsequently tender its debentures if the requi-
site majority of the bondholders approved the proposed amend-
ments.0 6 As we will discuss later, such a procedure eliminates most
of the objectionable features in current attempts to coerce
bondholders.107
Most importantly, the Form Three Offer, through its use of
the prior vote, eliminates the prisoner's dilemma. The offer only
succeeds if a majority of debtholders finds it to be in their best
100 The issuer may wish to tie the vote on the amendment to the conditional tender. In
other words, the vote on the amendment becomes a vote on whether to entertain the offer.
Professor Bebehuk has proposed a similar procedure, to solve the problem of "distorted"
choice in tender offers to shareholders in takeover bids. See Lucian Arye Bebehuk, The
Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 Del J Corp L 911, 931-32
(1987). The objective of his proposal "is to enable shareholders to express their preferences
concerning the bid's success separately from their desire to have their shares acquired in the
event of a takeover." Id at 931. While Professor Bebchuk describes impediments to solu-
tions to the shareholder distorted-choice problem by charter amendment, id at 935-41, there
appear to be no comparable impediments to a private law solution to the problem in the
debt context. There is no reason why bond indentures cannot be drafted to prohibit con-
strained- or distorted-choice offers.
107 Coercive pressure still remains if the corporation can pay for the vote, because the
corporation can split the total premium being offered into two components: one paid for
tender and one for voting. Ideally, it should be costless to a bondholder to oppose the deci-
sion at the voting stage. Yet, if by voting against the proposed plan, the bondholder is either
denied the ability to tender or sacrifices some portion of the premium, then opposition is
not costless. If vote buying is to be permitted, it would be less objectionable if the bond-
holder continued to enjoy the right to vote on a belated basis after the outcome were known
(and receive the same vote payment therefor). Then, if the offer succeeded, the bondholder
could vote in favor, tender, and receive the same total premium as other bondholders who
initially approved the plan. For a discussion of the debatable legitimacy of vote buying in
this context, see text accompanying notes 183-86.
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interests. At the same time, once the majority approves the offer,
all debtholders have a strong incentive to tender.
To illustrate, suppose that the facts are as in the preceding
discussion about financing a profitable venture. The firm has
bonds outstanding with a total face amount of $1,000 and a current
market value of $700; its equity is worth $100. The firm has an
opportunity to invest $550 in a way that will increase its total
value by $800, but the effect would be to buoy up the value of the
bonds from $700 to $1,000, and to reduce the value of the equity
from $100 to $50. The equityholders will be unwilling to invest the
$550 unless the debtholders agree to reduce their claims. In short,
there is a potential $250 gain to be shared, if only the equi-
tyholders and debtholders can agree on how to share it.
Suppose, then, that the firm makes a Form Three Offer to ex-
change the existing bonds for new bonds with a face amount, and
expected market value, of $800. The equityholders promise that, if
the offer succeeds, they will contribute the $550 to the firm to fund
the new project. The firm conditions its exchange offer on a prior
vote by the bondholders to amend the existing bond indenture to
eliminate all of the important protective covenants. Stripped of
their covenants, the existing bonds would be worth only $700.
Unless the bondholders believe that they can squeeze more of
the $250 gain out of the equityholders, it is in their interest that
the exchange succeed: the value of their claims will be $800 if the
exchange were to succeed rather than $700 if it does not. There-
fore, if a majority of the bondholders consents to the amendment
of the indenture, each bondholder will be confronted with a choice
between keeping a bond worth only $700 or exchanging it for a new
bond worth $800. The outcome is obvious: the exchange offer will
succeed and everyone will be better off.
In this scenario, there is coercion at the final stage, but the
bondholders will have imposed it upon themselves. The bondhold-
ers are never confronted with a prisoner's dilemma. Ultimately, a
majority of the bondholders will have coerced the rest to do what
the majority deemed to be in the bondholders' collective best in-
terest. If the majority had considered that the offer was a bad one,
the majority could have rejected it. There was no coercion to ac-
cept a bad offer.
The Form Three Offer does have one important limitation, as
do the Form One and Form Two Offers. It is designed to solve the
holdout problem. As such, the Form Three Offer will not work un-
less the existing bonds, once stripped of their covenants, will be
worth less than the new bonds offered in the exchange. The old
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bonds will still have a face amount of $1,000, and it is possible
that, even without protective covenants, they would be worth more
than $800 if the equityholders were to invest the additional $550 in
the new project. In that case, each bondholder would be con-
fronted with a choice between holding onto the old bond or ac-
cepting a new one with a lower value, and the exchange offer would
fail. If the bondholders could anticipate this outcome, presumably
they would refuse to consent to the amendment of the indenture.
What they should demand, in any event, is that any consent given
in anticipation of an exchange be negated if the subsequent ex-
change offer did not succeed in attracting some prescribed percent-
age of the bonds.""8
B. Disciplining the Holdout: The Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plan
and the Form Three Offer Compared
Our suggested approach, the Form Three offer that precedes
the tender with a bondholder vote, is vulnerable to one important
criticism: because exchange offers to bondholders frequently fail, 109
their real problem may be that they are not coercive enough.
Stripping the covenants from bonds may not be enough, for
example, to deter vulture funds from holding out for opportunistic
reasons. The managers of such funds may be willing to take risks,
possibly because of the psychological effects of having bought the
bonds, in the typical case, at very low prices. They may also be
unconcerned about the feelings of distaste that more conventional
members of the financial community may develop toward them.
And they may conclude that, even with the covenants stripped, the
expected return on the bonds is greater than the expected returns
on the securities offered in exchange. In this setting, coercion
would be ineffective because the issuer could not reduce the value
of the bonds enough. Yet, other bondholders may feel compelled to
accept the exchange offer, either because of the likely reduction in
the bonds' liquidity once the covenants are removed, or because, in
the absence of adequate disclosure, they overestimate the effect of
the indenture amendments.
Finally, the managers of vulture funds may hold out because
they believe that the issuer's management would not dare to ex-
ploit fully the discretion that the elimination of the covenants
108 Such a condition would also protect against the potentially coercive effect of an offer
by the firm of cash payments for consents.
109 See notes 21-22 (listing unsuccessful exchange and tender offers made in 1990).
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would give them, because the holdouts would still possess indepen-
dent legal remedies not based on contract. For example, if the is-
suer paid massive dividends to equityholders and then defaulted
on its bonds, the issuer's directors and management might be held
liable to the holdout bondholders, either under corporate law for
paying an unlawful dividend or under the law of fraudulent con-
veyances. 110 These constraints are especially significant because the
term of much high-yield debt is relatively short. As a result, the
vulture fund may doubt that any distribution paid to shareholders
on the eve of insolvency would survive judicial scrutiny. In short,
the contractual right to exploit the bondholders, once all protective
covenants are eliminated, is not equivalent to the legal right to do
SO.
It is thus puzzling that overleveraged issuers have not made
greater use of other techniques scaling down their debt. The most
obvious alternative is the prepackaged bankruptcy."-' In a
"prepackaged" Chapter 11 reorganization, the corporation secures
sufficient creditor consents to have a Chapter 11 plan confirmed by
the bankruptcy court, then files its Chapter 11 petition, and seeks
swift judicial approval of its proposed plan. If all goes well, the
court confirms the plan in as little as two or three months.1 2 The
attractiveness of this approach is that it requires the approval of
only two-thirds of the bondholders in principal amount, plus a ma-
jority in number of those who vote on the plan.113 In contrast, the
typical exchange offer today requires between ninety and ninety-
110 The Bankruptcy Code and two uniform state acts allow certain creditors and the
trustee in bankruptcy to rescind any transfer or payment by a debtor that was made with an
intent to defraud creditors, or that was made for less than a fair or reasonable equivalent at
a time when the debtor was insolvent or expected to incur debts in the future beyond its
ability to pay. See 11 USC §§ 544, 548 (1988). Eleven states have enacted the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), 7A ULA 427 (1985), and twenty-four have adopted the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), 7A ULA 639 (1985). The fraudulent conveyance
issue has arisen frequently in the context of an LBO that later files for bankruptcy. See
United States v Gleneagles Investment Co., 565 F Supp 556 (M D Pa 1983), aff'd as United
States v Tabor Court Realty, 803 F2d 1288 (3d Cir 1986) (applying the Pennsylvania
UFCA); Wieboldt Stores v Schottenstein, 94 Bankr 488 (Bankr N D Ill 1988); In re Revco
D.S., Inc., 118 Bankr 468 (Bankr N D Ohio 1990) (applying the Ohio UFCA). See generally
James F. Queenan, Jr., The Collapsed Leveraged Buyout and the Trustee in Bankruptcy,
11 Cardozo L Rev 1 (1989).
111 See 11 USC § 1126(b). For an overview, see sources cited in note 8.
n Turnarounds & Workouts, a trade publication, has prepared a chart showing nine
prepackaged bankruptcies filed since 1986. Of these, seven were confirmed within five
months, and of these seven, six were confirmed within three months. One was confirmed
within five weeks. See Special Report: Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans Attempted by Ma-
jor Companies, 5 Turnarounds & Workouts 3 (No 2, Feb 1, 1991).
"ll See 11 USC § 1126(c).
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five percent of all debtholders to accept the offer." 4 If the requisite
two-thirds of the bondholders approve the prepackaged bank-
ruptcy, the holdout problem is automatically solved because the
exchange of new securities for old is accomplished as a matter of
law.
In fact, corporate issuers have increasingly turned to prepack-
aged bankruptcy plans" 5 -but usually only after a proposed ex-
change offer has first failed.i"6 The advantages of prepackaged fil-
ings are well-known and numerous. First, a two-thirds vote is a
feasible goal. Second, the bondholders can vote prior to the filing
of the petition, thereby reducing uncertainty. Third, the bank-
ruptcy court can often quickly confirm the plan, sometimes within
two or three months."' Fourth, the costs of the procedure are
low.1"8 Fifth, the corporation can more easily obtain new financing
once a bankruptcy petition is filed." 9 Sixth, there are tax advan-
tages to effecting an exchange of debt securities in bankruptcy.
20
And, lastly, prepackaged bankruptcy avoids what is know as the
"LTV risk"-namely, the danger that on a subsequent bankruptcy
of the debtor, the holder of the new securities received in an ex-
change offer will be deemed to have a valid bankruptcy claim only
in the amount of the fair market value of the securities surren-
dered on the date of the exchange, rather than the face amount of
the new securities.'
114 See Salomon Brothers Study at 1 (cited in note 4).
I" See id.
21 During 1990, Interco, Inc., Tracor Inc., The Southland Corp., and JPS Textile
Group, Inc. turned to prepackaged bankruptcy plans after failing to secure the desired level
of acceptance of their exchange offers. Id at 8, 11, 13.
See note 112.
18 Martin Whitman, a prominent "vulture fund" investor, estimates that a typical ex-
change offer costs "between $5 million and $15 million in direct costs." Henry, 5 Turn-
arounds & Workouts at 2 (cited in note 8). These costs are lower in bankruptcy in large
measure because the court must approve all fees paid by the debtor and the fees of advisors
to the creditors. Indeed, this is one reason why industry professionals-both lawyers and
investment bankers-may prefer an exchange offer to a prepackaged bankruptcy.
11 For a discussion of "debtor in possession" financings, see Mark C. Robinan and
Michael A. Policano, Financing Chapter 11 Companies in the 1990s, 3 Continental Bank J
Applied Corp Fin 96 (1990).
110 Under the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, corporate issuers that exchange new
debt for old debt will normally have to realize cancellation of indebtedness income, because
of the repeal of Internal Revenue Code § 1275(a)(4) (1988). However, there is an exception
for a debtor in bankruptcy, which does not realize such income. See 26 USC § 108(a) (1988).
See Andrew N. Berg, Tax Changes: The Impact of the Budget Package on Debt Restruc-
turings, 5 Insights 9 (No 2, Feb 1991) (recommending use of prepackaged bankruptcy
alternative).
12I See In re Chateaugay Corp., 109 Bankr 51 (Bankr S D NY 1990). Because Chateau-
gay Corp. is a subsidiary of the LTV Corporation, this danger is known as the "LTV risk."
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Given these advantages, why do issuers even bother with an
exchange offer? The first answer appears to be the downside risk
that arises if the prepackaged plan hits a snag and the firm
thereby remains in bankruptcy for an extended period of time. In
such delays, bankruptcy costs mount, and management's ability to
run the firm is subject to judicial supervision. At present, the pos-
sibility of these snags is substantial: There are a number of signifi-
cant and unresolved legal issues surrounding the operation of
prepackaged bankruptcies, on which even prominent bankruptcy
commentators have disagreed vigorously.
122
A real-world example of how these uncertainties can disrupt
even the best-laid plans of the issuer is the recent difficulty of The
Southland Corporation in obtaining judicial confirmation of its
prepackaged bankruptcy, after four earlier exchange offer solicita-
tions had failed. 2 ' Although Southland had secured a favorable
two-thirds vote for the plan, dissident creditors attacked the ade-
quacy of the procedures followed and the vote tabulation methods
used by Southland, and the court ordered Southland to solicit a
While the decision has been appealed, its impact is to chill exchange offers, because the
prospect of bankruptcy is always present in the case of a financially distressed company that
is proposing a debt exchange offer. By accepting the exchange offer, the creditor sacrifices
the difference between the face amount of the securities given up and the lesser fair market
value of the securities received. The theory of Chateaugay is that the excess of the face
amount of the new debt security over the market value of the old security on the date of the
exchange (plus accreted interest) represents original issue discount and is disallowed in
bankruptcy. Id at 56-58. See 11 USC § 502(b)(2) (1988).
122 The greatest and most debated uncertainty concerns whether the solicitation of
votes on a prepackaged plan is governed exclusively by the federal securities laws or by
some combination of those laws and the Bankruptcy Code. Under § 1126(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 11 USC § 1126(b) (1988), the solicitation of consents before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition must be in "compliance with any applicable bankruptcy law, rule or
regulation governing the adequacy of disclosure in connection with such solicitation." This
means that there must be compliance with the federal proxy rules if the debt security is
listed on an exchange. Some commentators take the position that the Securities and Ex-
change Commission has exclusive jurisdiction, so that if it clears a proxy statement, there is
no further role for the bankruptcy court. See Case and Harwood, Current Issues in
Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plans (cited in note 8). Others contend that the bankruptcy court
may still invalidate the solicitation if it finds that there have been material omissions or
misstatements under the federal securities law standards; and that the bankruptcy court
may establish its own standards with regard to procedural, timing, and vote tabulation is-
sues. See also Chaim J. Fortgang and Thomas M. Mayer, Prepackaged Plans: Tyranny in
Chapter 11 Reorganizations (unpublished paper prepared for Bankruptcy Symposium spon-
sored by the New York University of Law, the Annual Survey of American Law, and the
John J. Galgay Fellowship Program, Apr 12, 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
123 See In re Southland Corporation, 124 Bankr at 211. See also Henry, 5 Turnarounds
& Workouts 1 (cited in note 8). The Southland plan was ultimately confirmed after a second
shareholder vote. See Tracking: Southland, 5 Turnarounds & Workouts 4 (No 5, Mar 15,
1991).
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new vote. Some participants have suggested that the dispute in the
Southland situation masked what was "a hold up by some dissi-
dents aimed at collecting legal fees."'1 24 Although we express no
judgment on this issue, prepackaged bankruptcy plans are vulnera-
ble in that small debtholders can delay judicial approval, even
when they do not hold enough debt to impede an exchange offer.
The problem is reminiscent of the nuisance derivative action
brought by shareholders owning only a handful of shares.
Economic considerations may also impede the success of
prepackaged bankruptcies. Today, the advisors who represent
bondholders often charge substantial fees that a bankruptcy court
would be unlikely to approve.125 Hence, the advisors' incentive is to
achieve a pre-bankruptcy resolution to avoid substantially losing
their fees.
Nevertheless, from a policy perspective, there is little need to
dwell on these factors that impede prepackaged bankruptcies. Over
time, legal uncertainties will be resolved or clarified, and the
prepackaged bankruptcy may prove a superior vehicle by which to
effect debt restructurings. Indeed, the prepackaged bankruptcy has
one significant advantage over debt exchange offers and other con-
sensual negotiations outside of bankruptcy: side payments and
holdouts are not possible. Inherently, all within a class are treated
equally and are bound by the class vote. Thus, there is not only
greater fairness within the class, but also less capital market uncer-
tainty and hence a lower cost of capital and greater efficiency.
Does this mean that prepackaged bankruptcies will gradually
displace debt exchange and tender offers? We doubt it. For several
reasons, we suspect that debt exchange and tender offers will con-
tinue to play a significant role in restructurings. First, issuers have
not yet fully exploited the potential for coercive indenture amend-
ments. Second, many issuers simply will not want to endure any
form of bankruptcy because of its perceived stigma. Finally, many
issuers may be ineligible to use the prepackaged bankruptcy tech-
nique because they are not insolvent, even though they would still
like to retire deeply discounted outstanding debt claims against
them. 126
2I See Henry, 5 Turnarounds & Workouts at 1 (cited in note 8) (quoting Martin
Whitman).
2" Merrill Lynch would have received over $16 million if Southland's out-of-court re-
structuring had been successful. See Schwimmer, Investment Dealers' Digest at 21 (cited in
note 2). In-court restructurings typically pay much lower fees because of the need for, and
difficulty of, judicial approval. Id.
126 Under this category, we would include transactions where a failure to effect a recapi-




For the near future, the most likely scenario is that financially
distressed issuers will simultaneously make an exchange offer and
solicit a prepackaged bankruptcy. In particular, such an issuer may
offer a marginally greater price in the exchange offer in order to
elicit the bondholders' consent, but may also signal that it will file
the prepackaged bankruptcy petition if a significant number of
bondholders hold out.127 Such a tactic would both deter holdouts
and minimize the risk of judicial supervision or delay in bank-
ruptcy. Most significantly, it also justifies our focus on how to re-
form debt exchange offers by shifting control over coercive mea-
sures from the corporate issuer to tle bondholders themselves.
Again, as we stated above, the prepackaged bankruptcy has only
one significant advantage over the Form Three Offer: it inherently
assures equality within the class, because side payments and spe-
cial deals are less possible in bankruptcy. Later, we will suggest
that enlightened SEC regulation could largely achieve such equal-
ity for Form Three Offers. 128
V. IMPLEMENTING THE FORM THREE OFFER
There are three basic ways to implement our proposed solu-
tion to the coexisting prisoner's dilemma and holdout problems. In
Part A, we consider certain self-help remedies available to bond-
holders-for instance, revising the indenture agreement to require
Form Three exchange offers or acting collectively to resist unfavor-
able exchange offers. In Part B, we evaluate several methods by
which a court could interpret existing indenture agreements to re-
quire Form Three Offers. In particular, we argue that the implied
covenant of good faith and the requirement of good faith voting by
bondholders might require corporations to propose restructurings
through Form Three Offers. Finally, in Part C, we propose certain
regulatory reforms under the Williams Act which could effectively
implement our proposed solution.
A. Self-Help Remedies
1. Revising the indenture.
In the future, for newly issued obligations, unfair coercion can
be foreclosed by altering the standard language of indentures. We
127 Such joint exchange offers and prepackaged solicitations have already appeared. See
Case and Harwood, Current Issues in Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plans at 44 (cited in note 8).
'" See notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
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recognize that this may be easier said than done. Since standard-
ized language, enhances marketability, changes are made grudg-
ingly. Moreover, the indenture is a long, detailed document. Pro-
spective buyers of bonds focus on the creditworthiness of the
issuer, the interest rate and duration of the debt, and, to a lesser
degree, the major covenants. Even the major covenants' price ef-
fects tend to be small and difficult to detect. A change in the in-
denture to protect against the unfair use of exit consents to coerce
an exchange might turn out to be important, but at the time of
issuance may have no discernible effect on the price at which the
obligation can be sold. Thus, issuers may have no incentive to give
up the power that is available to them under the present language.
At the same time, debt these days is sold mostly to large insti-
tutions with sophisticated staffs. If buyers were to request a
change in the language relating to amendment to prevent perni-
cious coercion, we believe many issuers would accede to such a re-
quest. The needed protection could be provided simply, with only
a small change in the existing standard language. Standard lan-
guage currently denies a vote to any obligations "owned" by the
issuer.'29 New language could deny the vote to obligations that
have been tendered to the issuer, unless the tender offer is open to
holders that vote against the proposed amendment; void any votes
for which the issuer has paid cash or any other consideration; or
void the consent if the exchange offer failed.' Such a change
should have no adverse effect on the marketability of the bonds,
and might even make obligations with the new language more
marketable.
Still, many issuers may resist the desired language and may
even be willing to incur a market penalty in the form of higher
interest rates in order to preserve their ability to make coercive
tender offers that avoid bankruptcy.13' Behind this resistance to
11" See notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
130 To make clear that a Form Three Offer would be permissible, it could be stated that
the voting prohibition is not intended to void any vote in connection with a tender offer that
is contingent on the outcome of the vote.
" A 1991 survey by Institutional Investor asked corporate chief financial officers
whether, if they were to offer bonds in the next six months, they would attach strong cove-
nants, weaker covenants providing only "some protection," or no covenants. Nine percent
said they would offer strong covenants, 43.8% said they would offer only "some protection,"
and 47.2% said they would offer no covenants. CFO Forum: Is Anyone Paying Any Heed to
Bondholders?, Institutional Investor 123 (Feb 1991). Such a finding suggests strong man-




stronger protections for bondholders may lie the pervasive phe-
nomenon of managerial risk aversion. Corporate management has
more reason to fear bankruptcy than do shareholders, who typi-
cally hold diversified portfolios. Management may resist including
bond covenants and other provisions that would reduce the firm's
cost of capital, even though such provisions would be in the inter-
est of their shareholders. Hence, we are unable to say that model
indenture provisions will alone solve the problem of unfair coercion
in debt exchange offers, and we acknowledge that the sophisticated
counsel who work in this field probably were well aware before
reading this Article that such protective provisions could be
designed.
13 2
2. Other market mechanisms.
Because the coercive effect of an exit consent depends on an
inability of debtholders to enter into an "enforceable agreement,"
debtholders may be able to protect themselves, or be protected by
others, in several ways. First, if the debtholders are few enough,
and if they are "repeat players," they may simply communicate
with each other and agree not to tender into the exchange offer. 133
Of course, they may instead agree that the offer is benign rather
than pernicious and that they should tender.""
Second, if dispersion of ownership lowers the value of debt ob-
ligations, one would expect individuals or entities to acquire the
obligations so as to overcome the dispersion problem. There is evi-
dence that this phenomenon has in fact occurred, especially among
1" We also note that some sophisticated institutional investors have recently petitioned
the SEC for regulatory reform of the exit consent problem, although they more than anyone
else were in a position to demand and draft new indenture language. See note 182.
133 See Pat Widder, Debt Orchestrates '90s Theme: "Deals Done Again", Chi Trib CI
(Sep 6, 1990) (quoting an investment manager as saying that "'holders of junk know each
other and are getting to know each other better' "); Schifrin, Enough Already! Forbes at 132
(cited in note 20) (bondholders organizing "through an association that collects and distrib-
utes information about defaults, and passes along advice on how to deal with exchange of-
fers"; informal committees of bondholders organized by an investment adviser who is paid a
fee).
'3 This was the case in Katz, 508 A2d at 878 n 6. Specifically, one debt issue involved
in the case was 85% owned by four financial institutions, with one investment banker own-
ing 55%; while another issue was 69.1% owned by four institutions; still another issue was
85% owned by five institutions; and the remaining issue was approximately 45% owned by
two banks. Presumably the exchange offer was approved in advance by the debtholders,
which explains why the court seems to have assumed that there was no coercion (true, as to
the major investors) or a benign effort to solve the holdout problem (as to the other
holders).
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vulture funds.135 Still, these more sophisticated bondholders are
exactly the parties who may seek to take advantage of the other
bondholders by either holding out or demanding a side payment.
Thus, solving one problem may exacerbate another.
If self-help and market mechanisms were likely to solve the
problem, there would be little need for judicial intervention. But
self-help, even if feasible, does involve some costs. Market mecha-
nisms are also costly to implement and, because the purchasers
who overcome the dispersion problem must be rewarded for their
efforts, they will not fully compensate the original dispersed own-
ers. The result will be an impediment to the initial issuance of
debt obligations to the public, with a corresponding increase in
cost for issuers."8" The optimal remedy then should be a minimally
intrusive one that facilitates self-help measures, but assures that
the bondholders' choice is not distorted by managerial pressure.
We restate below why we think our proposals satisfy these criteria.
B. Construing the Indenture Agreement
The basic claims and rights of bondholders are specified in de-
tail in the bond indenture. In settling disputes over bondholder
claims and rights, courts have generally looked to the language of
the indenture and applied traditional techniques for interpreting
contracts, rather than invoking judicially developed doctrines, such
as the doctrine of fiduciary obligation.137 As the American Bar
131 See Peterson, LA Times at D1 (cited in note 2) ("a growing number of 'vulture
firms' are snatching up distressed bonds at garage-sale prices"); Schifrin, Pay Up, Forbes 74
(cited in note 23). See also Paul Richter, "Debt Raiders" See Bull Market in Bankruptcies,
LA Tines D1 (Oct 21, 1990).
135 Issuers can avoid this cost by providing protection in the debt contract against coer-
cive offers. However, the language of publicly issued debt covenants changes slowly, if at all,
even after events seem to have established a need for new language. For example, in Morgan
Stanley & Co. v Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F Supp 1529, 1532-34 (S D NY 1983),
Morgan Stanley & Co., a sophisticated and economically powerful investment banking firm,
complained that the issuer of certain debt obligations had redeemed those obligations in
violation of the language of the indenture and its expectations as an investor. The court
denied Morgan Stanley's motion for summary judgment. Yet investors like Morgan Stanley
continued to accept the same language in obligations issued after the decision. Presumably
some issuers did not expect to take advantage of that language in the manner about which
Morgan Stanley complained. Yet they may have paid a price for the opportunity to do so.
Some repeat issuers might be subject to informal sanctions, as was apparently true for
Archer Daniels, the defendant in the case. See Richard S. Wilson and Frank J. Fabozzi, The
New Corporate Bond Market 188 (Probus, 1990) (Archer Daniels's next bond issue "was not
well received" and a subsequent issue contained strong investor protection.).
137 This statement is valid for the problems considered in this Article. It is worth not-
ing, however, that the claims of debtholders are substantially affected by bankruptcy law





[T]he rights of holders of debt securities are largely a matter
of contract. There is no governing body of statutory or com-
mon law that protects the holder against harmful acts by the
debtor except in the most extreme situations. Short of bank-
ruptcy, the debt securityholder can do nothing to protect him-
self against actions of the borrower which jeopardize its abil-
ity to pay the debt unless he takes a mortgage or other
collateral or establishes his rights through contractual provi-
sions set forth in the . . . indenture. 8'
Although courts have uniformly held that directors of a corpo-
ration do not owe a fiduciary duty to bondholders, 13 9 there is an
important, but ill-defined, exception to this general rule, which
arises when the corporation becomes insolvent. 140 The source of
this potential fiduciary duty to debtholders has been traced by
some courts to the "trust fund doctrine,"'141 which they interpret to
hold "'that all of the assets of the corporation, immediately on its
becoming insolvent, become a trust fund for the benefit of all of its
creditors.' ,",12 The case law is ambiguous as to what defines insol-
vency for purposes of this fiduciary duty: a balance sheet test, an
actual inability to pay debts as they mature, or the corporation's
ceasing to operate as a going concern.143 It is even cloudier as to
whether the "springing" fiduciary duty that arises on insolvency
(however defined) brings into play the same open-ended fiduciary
1s American Bar Foundation, Commentaries on Model Debenture Indentures at 2
(cited in note 53). This passage is quoted and relied upon in Sharon Steel Corporation v
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F2d 1039, 1049 (2d Cir 1982). See also Simons v Cogan,
549 A2d 300 (Del Sup Ct 1987); Comment, Debenture Holders and the Indenture Trustee:
Controlling Managerial Discretion in the Solvent Enterprise, 11 Harv J L & Pub Pol 461,
477-81 (1988); William W. Bratton, Jr., The Interpretation of Contracts Governing Corpo-
rate Debt Relationships, 5 Cardozo L Rev 371, 374 (1984)(arguing for a "neoclassical" ap-
proach, in which judges attempt to "protect the particular parties' expectations").
139 See Simons, 549 A2d at 304.
140 Simons v Cogan, 542 A2d 785, 788 (Del Chanc 1987).
141 In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F2d 1266, 1268-70 (5th Cir 1983).
14I Saracco Tank & Welding Co. v Platz, 65 Cal App 2d 306, 150 P2d 918, 923 (1944)
(quoting William M. Fletcher, 15 Fletcher's Cyclopedia of Corporations § 7369 at 59 (Calla-
ghan, 1938)).
" In MortgageAmerica, the court framed the test as follows: "Those who control an
insolvent corporation that can no longer be considered a true going concern are. . . 'charged
with the duty of seeing that the creditors of a corporation [are] either paid in full or they
are paid pro rata out of the funds received from the assets of the corporation.'" 714 F2d at
1271 (quoting Waggoner v Herring-Showers Lumber Co., 120 Tex 605, 615, 40 SW2d 1, 5
(1931)).
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duties of care and loyalty that are owed to stockholders (in normal
times), or whether the duty should be more narrowly construed
simply to forbid the directors from diverting corporate assets for
the benefit of themselves or preferred creditors.1 44 New York deci-
sions in this area seem substantially more inclined to impose liabil-
ity on directors than those of Delaware.
145
These cases suggest that corporate officials of an insolvent
firm do owe some "extracontractual" duties beyond simply observ-
ing the terms of the bondholders' contract, but the courts have ap-
plied these duties largely only to preclude transactions that would
resemble a voidable preference in bankruptcy or a fraudulent con-
veyance. These decisions do not yet support any general affirma-
tive duty to bondholders that might require the directors to obtain
the best possible substantive terms (or even fair terms) for the
bondholders in any recapitalization. Still, given the existence of
some extracontractual duties owed to the bondholders once the is-
suer becomes insolvent, it might fairly be argued that the directors
have an obligation to adopt fair procedures that permit the bond-
holders to exercise their own uncoerced judgment-in short, the
Form Three Offer. Although such a doctrinal development is possi-
ble, it would require a judicial leap, and thus we discuss possible
narrower theories to this same end.
1. Construing "ownership" of the bonds.
Most provisions in bond indentures may be amended with the
consent of at least a majority (generally, however, two-thirds) in
face amount of the "outstanding" bonds.' 46 For purposes of voting
on amendments, the almost universally used indenture language
provides that "outstanding" bonds do not include those "owned"
by the obligor. 147 This is sometimes referred to as a "sterilization"
144 For this narrower interpretation, see Rosebud Corp. v Boggio, 39 Colo App 84, 90,
561 P2d 367, 372 (1977); Fountain v Burke, 160 Ga App 262, 264, 287 SE2d 39, 41 (1982);
Bortner v J.C. Lieb Co., 146 Md 530, 542, 126 A 890, 895 (1924) (all prohibiting repayment
of debts or claims to corporate officers or directors); Wilkinson u Bauerle, 41 NJ Eq 635,
644, 7 A 514, 518 (1886).
2'5 Compare New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v Weiss, 304 NY 547,
110 NE2d 397 (1953), and Clarkson Co., Ltd. v Shaheen, 660 F2d 506, 513 (2d Cir 1981),
with Asmussen v Quaker City Corp., 156 A 180 (Del Chanc 1931).
14' American Bar Foundation, Commentaries on Model Debenture Indentures at 41-42,
305 (cited in note 53). Note, however, that the core provisions relating to principal, interest,
and maturity may not be amended. See note 54.
"47 See American Bar Foundation, Commentaries on Model Debenture Indentures at
42 (cited in note 53); American Bar Association, Model Simplified Indenture, 38 Bus Law at
763 (cited in note 53). See also Katz, 508 A2d 873.
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rule. The contract interpretation issue when there is a challenge to
the use of the exit consent procedure turns largely on the meaning
of the word "owned" in the sterilization provision.
In the exit consent procedure, essentially, the owner of the
bond votes by giving consent to the amendment. In a literal sense,
at the time the amendment is voted upon, the obligor does not
"own" the bonds; they are still owned by the person who has ten-
dered them. It is true that the bonds are voted in a manner consis-
tent with the wishes of the obligor, and that the obligor may have
constrained the holder's voting choice by creating a prisoner's di-
lemma, but the indenture language is narrow. It says "owned," not
"owned or controlled" or some other such broad language. It would
be possible, of course, to devise language that would clearly fore-
close or limit the exit consent procedure.'4" But we are aware of no
indenture that contains such language. There are, of course, sub-
stantial advantages to this literal, or "plain-meaning," approach:
certainty and consistency, which can be important for market
efficiency.'49
A broader interpretation of "ownership" would not frustrate
the presumed intent of the parties. In an exchange offer with exit
consent, bonds are tendered to the obligor accompanied by the
consent. They are not redeemed by the obligor at the time of the
tender, or at the time of the effectuation of the consent, but the
parties' expectation is that some or all of the bonds will be re-
deemed in due course. It would not be a great stretch of the word
"owned" to treat bonds held by the obligor in this setting as bonds
"owned" by the obligor. Such an interpretation might not even re-
quire use of a subterfuge concept like "constructive" ownership to
avoid the plain meaning of the sterilization provision, but if such a
concept might help in justifying the result, there is certainly a
strong tradition in the law for providing that help.
The fact that "ownership" might be read broadly does not,
however, mean that it must be. One must ask whether such an in-
148 See text accompanying notes 128-30.
149 Compare Sharon Steel Corporation, 691 F2d at 1039, where the court pointed to the
need for certainty in the capital markets, and concluded that interpretation of boilerplate
indenture provisions should be a matter of law for the court and not a matter of fact for the
jury or other trier of fact. See Bratton, 5 Cardozo L Rev at 401-02 (cited in note 138).
However, an interpretation of the sterilization clause to exclude pernicious exchange
offers with exit consents might not seriously undercut the goals of certainty and consistency.
It would not depend on the particular expectations of individual lenders and borrowers.
Most bonds are governed by New York law. Thus, if the New York courts adopted an inter-
pretation precluding pernicious offers, uniformity would be achieved. It is hard to see how
an initial decision to that effect could cause surprise or consternation in the bond market.
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terpretation produces an appealing result, or whether that inter-
pretation seems likely to be consistent with the intent of the par-
ties. In responding to this inquiry, we can begin with the apparent
purpose of the sterilization clause: ensuring that bonds are voted in
the interest of the obligees rather than in the interests of the obli-
gor. In the case of an exit consent accompanying a tender into an
exchange offer, if the exit consent is used for a pernicious purpose,
the vote effectively serves the interests of the obligor at the ex-
pense of the obligees. In such a setting, the exit consent falls
within a general category of actions that the sterilization clause is
designed to protect against.
On the other hand, exit consents can also be used for benign
purposes; interpreting "ownership" to cover bonds held for re-
demption with an exit consent would preclude that benign use.
What is particularly troublesome is that such an interpretation
might preclude the use of exit consents even in the case of a Form
Three Offer, and one should recall that a Form Three Offer (unac-
companied by vote buying) cannot be used perniciously. 150
One could, of course, torture the interpretation of "ownership"
to produce a rule allowing the use of exit consents for benign, but
not for pernicious, purposes; or to produce a rule permitting Form
Three Offers, but not Form One or Form Two Offers. Although
various distinctions can be made in terms of who has possession of
the bonds at the time of the vote, most of these distinctions col-
lapse under close analysis. Ultimately, creative construction of this
kind trivializes the legitimate role of interpretation. It is better, we
think, to generate a rule consistent with good results by invoking
one of the two judicial constructs described below: the implied cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing or the requirement of good
faith voting.
2. The implied covenant of good faith.
Today, all contracts are interpreted to contain an implied cov-
enant of good faith."5 Basically, this means that "there is an im-
150 That is, Form Three Offers unaccompanied by payments for the vote or consent
cannot distort bondholder choice. A significant payment for the vote, however, does penalize
those who wish to vote "no" and gives rise to the prisoner's dilemma problem. To see this,
consider a case of a bond trading at $700 where the issuer offers $300 for the vote and $401
for the bond, but the amendment will reduce the bond's value to $300. A substantial pay-
ment for the vote can make the Form Three Offer effectively equivalent to a Form Two
Offer.
15' See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981). See also Steven J. Burton,




plied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will have
the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract . *.".., What are the "fruits of
the contract" in the case of a bond indenture? It is too much to
argue that all the protective covenants in the indenture constitute
such fruits because clearly the indenture contemplates that they
can be amended. It might be argued that any amendment of the
indenture contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting
should offer mutual advantages and should not be deliberately in-
tended to make all non-consenting bondholders worse off. But
again, this proposed interpretation is too vague and would also bar
Form Three Offers.
A more focused definition of the implied covenant of good
faith has been given by the Chancellor of Delaware in a case deal-
ing precisely with coercive debt exchange offers. In Katz v Oak In-
dustries, Inc.,153 Chancellor Allen supplied the following test for
measuring the implied covenant of good faith:
[I]s it clear from what was expressly agreed upon that the
parties who negotiated the express terms of the contract
would have agreed to proscribe the act later complained of as
a breach of the implied covenant of good faith-had they
thought to negotiate with respect to that matter.
15 4
In short, can one identify some express term in the contract that is
rendered meaningless or illusory by the challenged conduct so that
one cannot believe that rational parties would negotiate the ex-
press term without also wanting to proscribe the challenged con-
duct (if they had focused on it)? Although the Katz decision up-
held the exchange offer at issue, this mode of analysis may supply
bondholders with a powerful argument. Would bondholders that
had required the issuer to agree that it would not vote any shares
it "owned" (as the standard indenture provides) have permitted
the issuer to vote shares beneficially owned by it but still legally
"'1 Kirke La Shelle Co. v Paul Armstrong Co., 263 NY 79, 87, 188 NE 163, 167 (1933).
For a recent use of the "fruits of the agreement" language, see Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F Supp 1504, 1518-19 (S D NY 1989), where the court refused
to provide additional protection that would, in its view, have required not just shoring up an
existing covenant but writing in a new one, "an additional benefit for which [the plaintiffs]
did not bargain."
250 Katz, 508 A2d at 873. See also Kass v Eastern Airlines, Inc., CA Nos 8700, 8701 and
8711, slip op (Del Chanc, Nov 14, 1986) (bondholder votes purchased in return for cash or
ticket discounts).
1" Katz, 508 A2d at 880.
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held of record by a tendering bondholder? 155 We think not, be-
cause it exposes them to the prisoner's dilemma.156 We do not see
15 We recognize that in Katz, Chancellor Allen purported to explain why the standard
indenture restriction on "the voting of treasury securities" did not bar vote buying by the
issuer. 508 A2d at 881. He wrote:
The evident purpose of the restriction ... is to afford protection against the issuer
voting as a bondholder in favor of modifications that would benefit it as issuer, even
though such changes would be detrimental to bondholders. But the linking of the ex-
change offer and the consent solicitation does not involve the risk that bondholder
interests will be affected by a vote involving anyone with a financial interest in the
subject of the vote other than a bondholder's interest.
Id. His reasoning was that the "proposed consents [will] be granted or withheld only by
those with a financial interest to maximize the return on their investment in Oak's bonds
. . . [and] the incentive to consent is equally available to all members of each class of bond-
holders." Id. We disagree with this analysis because its logic denies bondholders the ability
to negotiate with the issuer effectively. See note 150.
156 The problem with Chancellor Allen's analysis, in our view, is that it ignores the
prisoner's dilemma problem, as it applies to the Form Two Offer. See notes 67-68 and ac-
companying text. Suppose a majority of the bondholders actually believe that their bonds
will be worth $800 (either based on their intrinsic value or what they believe the issuer's
next offer will be if they reject its first offer). The issuer, however, has offered only $710 plus
a $40 payment for their vote. The effect of the amendments will be to reduce the value of
the bonds to $700, which had previously traded in a thin market at around $725. Assuming
the bondholders cannot communicate, their decision matrix looks like this:
Your Choice
Don't Consent Consent
and Tender and Tender
Don't Consent





and Tender $700 $750
Here, it is rational to consent and tender, because the payoff from the combination of
$800 and $750 obviously exceeds the payoff from the combination of $800 and $700. Thus,
as long as one suspects that fellow bondholders may consent and tender, it is rational to do
likewise. Chancellor Allen's analysis focuses only on the danger that an issuer may buy 51%
of the bonds in order to strip the covenants. Yet, vote payments may also be used to create
the above decision matrix under which it is individually rational to do what a majority of
the bondholders would collectively consider to be irrational. We suspect that Form Two
Offers, such as the foregoing, which often involve a modest tender premium and a significant
vote payment, may be used particularly when the issuer decides to obtain indenture amend-
ments to facilitate a specific transaction (such as a dividend). See note 64.
Absent vote buying, a bondholder that believes that the issuer will respond to a nega-
tive vote by making a higher offer can vote no; with vote buying, it must factor into its
analysis the behavior of the other bondholders (both in voting and tendering). Our view of
the standard indenture clause's purpose is that it was intended to give bondholders an un-
constrained choice in voting decisions that does not require them to vote contrary to their
best judgment because of their estimates of how their fellow holders would vote.
Despite our objections to the test framed in Katz, we recognize that the exchange offer
in that case was probably benign, given the premium offered, the low number of bondhold-
1260 [58:1207
Bondholder Coercion
any plausible reason why rational parties would cover the first situ-
ation (legal ownership) and not the second (beneficial ownership).
Still, under this interpretation, is a Form Three Offer also for-
bidden? Seemingly not, because, in the Form Three Offer, the vote
precedes the tender and is the product of the undisturbed choice
of the bondholders. Even under the expansive definition given
"beneficial ownership" under the federal securities laws, this dis-
tinction may stand up. The federal securities laws define one to be
a "beneficial owner" of a security if one has or shares "voting
power" or "investment power" over the security.'57 Today, under
SEC Rule 13d-3, the corporate issuer is probably deemed a benefi-
cial holder of an equity security once it receives a proxy or consent
or the bonds are tendered into the offer so that the issuer effec-
tively obtains the power to purchase them (and thus to "dispose"
of them); this conclusion holds whether the offer is a Form One,
Two, or Three Offer. Yet, uniquely, a Form Three Offer could be
designed so that the issuer would not be the beneficial holder of
the bonds under this standard at the time the consents are solic-
ited and voted. Because the vote precedes the tender, it is possible
to give the proxies to an independent third party, such as a bank
or trust company. Then, if the bonds could not be tendered until
after the vote was taken, the issuer would lack both voting power
and any arguable investment power over the bonds at the time of
the vote, so it should not be deemed their "beneficial owner." We
recognize that contractual provisions in an indenture need not be
construed in light of definitions in the federal securities laws, but
the policies underlying these rules are uniquely relevant to the
context of exchange and tender offers. In short, even under the
most expansive definition of "ownership," a Form Three Offer
need not be treated the same as a Form One or Form Two Offer.
In the last analysis, the role of the implied covenant of good
faith is to protect the flanks of a contract's express provisions.
Here, the express provision in the indenture "sterilizes" the issuer
from voting its own bonds in its self-interest. Once the parties
agree to such a provision, it seems likely that they would have
ers (which could therefore have successfully resisted), and the fact that new funds were
being brought into the firm by a third party.
157 See Rules 13d-3(a) and 14d-1(b)(4), 17 CFR §§ 240.13d-3(a) and 240.14d-l(b)4
(1991). However, under the last clause of Rule 14d-l(b)(4), mere voting power does not
make one a beneficial owner for purposes of the tender offer rules. "Voting power" is de-
fined to include "the power to vote, or to direct the voting of such security," and "invest-
ment power" is defined to include "the power to dispose, or to direct the disposition of such
security." See Rule 13d-3(a).
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wanted to protect the flanks of that provision from an evasion
under which the issuer acquired "beneficial ownership" before it
acquired record ownership. But the bondholders' decision to vote
for the tender or exchange offer by approving the indenture
amendments is not similarly compromised; the issuer should be
seen as acquiring a beneficial interest in the bonds only after bond-
holders vote their acceptance of its offer. If this conclusion is ac-
cepted, Form Three Offers stand on a different footing from Form
One and Two Offers.
3. Good faith voting by debtholders.
Another legal theory that might be used to attack coercive ex-
change offers is based not on an obligation of the corporation to
the debtholders but rather on an obligation of the debtholders to
each other. The theory is simply that the debtholders must vote in
good faith. The leading case is an old one, Hackettstown National
Bank v D.G. Yuengling Brewing Co.515 The plaintiff in that case
was a holder of a minority of the bonds of a corporation that had
defaulted on its obligation to pay interest. The principal share-
holder, Yuengling, formed an alliance with a man named Betz, who
bought enough bonds so that, together with the bond holdings of
Yuengling and his friends and relatives, they had the three-fourths
in value necessary to amend the indenture to postpone the obliga-
tion to pay interest. Yuengling had agreed personally to repay
Betz's investment, with adeqhate interest. Although the language
of the indenture allowed amendment by a three-fourths vote, with-
out qualification, the court nullified the amendment, saying that a
vote that is "made collusively.., for the purpose of defeating the
remedy of the minority, and not in the exercise of an honest dis-
cretion in the general interest, is not a consent within the meaning
of the [indenture] . ' '159 In what may seem to be a questionable reli-
ance on the fiduciary obligation of partners to one another, the
court stated that "[c]ommunity of interest, whether in'the case of
partners or security holders, creates mutual obligation, and im-
158 Hackettstown Natl Bank v D.G. Yuengling Brewing Co., 74 F 110 (2d Cir 1896).
The case was featured in a leading treatise on bonds published in 1937. Ralph A. McClel-
land and Frederick S. Fisher, Jr., The Law of Corporate Mortgage Bond Issues 824 (Calla-
ghan, 1937), (reprinted by William S. Hein, 1983). The case also "figured in prominent legal
corporate finance texts of the 1930s." Roe, 97 Yale L J at 252 (cited in note 24).
155 Hackettstown, 74 F at 112.
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poses upon all persons occupying that position the duty of acting
in good faith toward the interests of their associates. '"1 10
The collusion and blatant bad faith in Hackettstown are not
present when debtholders execute an exit consent. Yet the idea
that bondholders should act toward one another in good faith
hardly seems surprising. The question would remain, however, of
how to interpret the requirement of "good faith" in the context of
an exchange offer with exit consent. To answer this question, think
of the prisoner's dilemma. Each prisoner votes knowing that he or
she is imposing harm on the other. Each acts in contravention of
the common good. From one perspective, this is "bad faith"; from
another, it is acting in one's rational self-interest. While we do not
predict that courts will invalidate the use of exit consents on bad
faith grounds, such a result would not astonish us. In the case of a
pernicious use of an exit consent strategy, each debtholder exe-
cutes a consent believing that its action is contrary to the common
good. It is hard to see how a judicially imposed prohibition on such
action would undercut the contract. It is hard to imagine that any
parties to a contract, if confronted at the negotiation stage with a
rule adopting such a prohibition, would reject it.
A more troublesome concern arises from the fact that the exit
consent strategy may be used for benign purposes, namely, to solve
the holdout problem. A court might be reluctant to adopt a rule
that would either be overbroad (rejecting any use of exit consents,
even if benign) or would require a perhaps difficult determination
of whether a particular offer was benign or pernicious. But there is
an easy answer to this concern. Recall that the holdout problem
can be solved by any of the three forms of offer. Form One and
Form Two Offers both can be used for benign or for pernicious
purposes, while Form Three Offers can only be used to accomplish
the benign objective. Thus a court might conclude that even
though a Form One or Form Two Offer may serve a benign objec-
tive, because those offers can also serve a pernicious objective, and
because there is another way to achieve the benign objective, all
Form One and Form Two Offers should be "presumed" pernicious.
Accordingly, any votes (consents) in response to them would be "in
bad faith."
160 Id. Compare Hogg v Hoag, 107 F 807, 818 (Cir Ct S D NY 1901), which, in a case
involving a dispute that was essentially among equityholders, cited Hackettstown to support
the following statement:
But the trust provision by which the majority in interest of certificate holders were to
control its management is not to be construed as permitting an arbitrary and inequita-
ble exercise of the power of the majority towards the minority. Such provisions are
enforceable only when the majority exercises an honest discretion in the interests of all.
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The same result might be reached without use of ideas such as
"presumption" or "bad faith." Still, if those familiar legal phrases
or constructs are comforting to some, no harm comes from using
them.
C. Regulatory Reform
Tender offers, including exchange offers, are regulated on the
federal level by the Williams Act. 6' Most of the mechanical rules
of the Williams Act are set forth in § 14(d) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, while its other relevant section, § 14(e), pro-
claims a broad antifraud rule. Section 14(d) applies by its terms
only to tender offers for the equity securities of "reporting" com-
panies, 162 while § 14(e) applies to all tender offers, including offers
for debt securities and securities of non-reporting companies.6 3 As
a result, the rules adopted by the SEC under § 14(d) do not apply
on their face to debt tender offers.
Three important tender offer rules fall under this heading: (1)
the withdrawal rule, (2) the proration rule, and (3) the "best price"
rule. First, under § 14(d)(5), tendering shareholders have the right
to withdraw shares tendered to a bidder "until the expiration of
seven days after the time definitive copies of the offer ... are first
published or sent or given to securities holders."'6 As extended by
Rule 14d-7,6 5 a shareholder may withdraw tendered shares for the
life of the tender offer. As a practical matter, this means that if a
rival bid is made, the tendering shareholder may withdraw and ac-
cept the higher bid, at least until the point at which the first bid-
der accepts the shares. In contrast, in debt tender offers, it is cus-
tomary to provide only limited withdrawal rights and sometimes
none at all. 6 The effect is to limit the ability of holdouts or rival
161 The principal sections of the Williams Act relevant to this Article's analysis are
§§ 14(d) and 14(e). See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 14(d) and 14(e), 15 USC
§§ 78(n)(d) and 78(n)(e) (1988).
16" The Williams Act, § 14(d), applies to tender offers for "any class of equity security
which is registered pursuant to Section 12 of this title" and to equity securities of certain
exempt issuers, such as insurance companies and mutual funds. It also applies only to
tender offers for more than 5% of the class. 15 USC § 78(n)(d). In addition, some of its
subsections specifically refer to "equity securities." See 15 USC § 78(n)(d)(6).
263 The Williams Act, § 14(e), which largely parallels SEC Rule 10b-5, refers to "fraud-
ulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in
favor of any such offer, request, or invitation." 15 USC § 78(n)(e).
1 6 15 USC § 78(n)(d)(5).
165 17 CFR § 240.14d-7 (1991).
66 See Note, 91 Colum L Rev at 852 (cited in note 5) (citing issuer exchange offer to
Western Union bondholders in which no right of withdrawal was provided).
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bidders to persuade tendering bondholders to reconsider their de-
cision and withdraw.
A more important right is the proration right afforded by
§ 14(d)(6), which requires that in the event a partial offer is over-
subscribed, the issuer must take up the excess securities "as nearly
as may be pro rata.' 16 7 Thus, if a bid is made for 50 percent of a
corporation's stock, and 100 percent is tendered, every shareholder
will have half its shares accepted and half returned. This rule of
equal treatment, which SEC Rule 14d-816s now extends for the life
of the offer, reduces the pressure to tender. However, by its terms,
Rule 14d-8 is inapplicable to debt tender offers.'6 9 Thus, an issuer
can structure its offer so that it makes a partial bid (say for 80
percent of the debt securities in the class) and announce that it
will accept these bonds on a "first come, first served" basis. The
result is that bondholders that do not tender at or near the outset
of the offer will face the prospect that the offer will be oversub-
scribed or at least that a disproportionately high percentage of
their securities will be returned. This means not only that they will
receive less than other bondholders, but that they will thereafter
hold securities with reduced protections as the result of the ad-
verse indenture amendments that the issuer also likely sought. To-
day, issuers are exploiting this technique in debt tender offers by
providing for full proration for only a limited period and then first
come, first served acceptance thereafter. 70 Not only does this tac-
tic reduce the time bondholders have to evaluate the offer, but it
may make bondholders wary of advice from those urging them to
hold out, who might in fact have an adverse interest.1
7
1
Finally, § 14(d)(7) sets forth the Williams Act's "best price"
rule: If the tender offer's terms are varied or increased, the bidder
must pay "the increased consideration to each security holder
whose securities are taken up and paid for pursuant to the of-
fer.' 72 Another SEC rule, Rule 10b-13, prohibits the bidder from
"67 15 USC § 78(n)(d)(6). This section applies by its terms only to shares deposited
within the first ten days after the offer is commenced. But see note 176.
168 17 CFR § 240.14d-8 (1991).
' Rule 14d-8 specifically refers to "equity securities."
170 See Note, 91 Colum L Rev at 851-52 (cited in note 5) (discussing Greyhound and
other debt tender offers using this technique).
7 For example, after encouraging others to hold out, the adviser can itself tender and
thereby decrease the percentage of its bonds that would be returned by virtue of proration.
171 See 15 USC § 78n(d)(7) (1982). This statutory rule is amplified by Rule 14d-10,
which states in subsection (a)(2) that: "The consideration paid to any security holder pursu-
ant to the tender offer is the highest consideration paid to any other security holder during
such tender offer." See 17 CFR § 240.14d-10 (1991).
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purchasing outside the tender offer during its pendency, thus pro-
tecting the flanks of the "best price" rule against evasion through
privately negotiated purchases. 173 But again, Rule 10b-13 applies
by its terms only to equity securities. Hence, a bidder may tender
at a price of, say, $500 per bond, but then pay $600 in a privately
negotiated purchase for a "swing" block that just gives it sufficient
consents to amend the indenture.
Under § 14(e), the SEC has promulgated rules that do apply
to debt tender offers. The most important of these is Rule 14e-1,
which requires that a tender offer be kept open for a minimum
period of twenty business days174 and that there be a ten business
day extension of the offer after any increase or decrease in the of-
fered premium.1 75 Yet, the practical impact of this rule is limited
because of the bidder's ability to manipulate the proration period.
For example, if a bidder tenders (or makes an exchange offer) for
eighty percent of the bonds. and announces a first come, first
served acceptance rule,' 76 any sophisticated bondholder will recog-
nize that if it waits until the last day (that is, the twentieth busi-
ness day) to tender, it risks having all or most of its bonds re-
turned (and they will then be subject to any adverse indenture
amendment for which the bidder was simultaneously soliciting
consents). In short, the twenty business day rule may become a
practical nullity because those who wish to tender must do so
within the shorter proration period.
77
In this light, an obvious reform would be to extend the prora-
tion and withdrawal rules to apply to debt tender offers in order to
preserve a twenty business day period for investment decisionmak-
ing in a context that is easily as complicated as that of equity
tender offers. Although we would favor such an extension of the
proration and withdrawal rules, we doubt that such changes would
have more than a marginal impact. Bondholders that can coordi-
nate do not need to fear issuer manipulation of the proration rules,
and partial bids are not generally an effective strategy for the is-
173 See 17 CFR § 240.10b-13 (1991).
174 See Rule 14e-l(a), 17 CFR § 240.14e-l(a) (1991).
175 See Rule 14e-l(b), 17 CFR § 240.14e-l(b) (1991).
17 Typically, this first come, first served period will begin only after the expiration of
some earlier period (for example, 10 days) during which bonds will be prorated if the offer is
oversubscribed during that period. The effect is to truncate the 20 business day period into
this shorter proration period. It was exactly this consequence that led the SEC to adopt
Rule 14d-8 that extended proration for the life of the tender offer.
177 Of course, if the bondholders can agree among themselves on a collective action
strategy they cannot be pressured in this fashion.
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suer because it typically needs to acquire ninety to ninety-five per-
cent of the bonds in order to realize the benefits of the recapitali-
zation. 17 The fear of proration will not stampede those with the
stomach to hold out.
What steps could the SEC take that would make sense? We
recommend a revision to an existing rule and two new rules. First,
Rule 10b-13 should be revised so that it applies to debt securities
as well as to equity securities.179 At a stroke, this reform would
limit the ability of the issuer to offer side deals or higher prices to
those threatening to hold out or to exercise their "blocking" posi-
tion to veto the proposed indenture amendment. Thus, it would
help to assure equality of treatment and to reduce the incentive for
holdouts to seek a disproportionate share of the issuer's assets. Al-
though we see no legal obstacle to the Commission's adoption of
such a revised rule, 180 its utility may be limited because of one ob-
vious means for its evasion: the issuer can still pay more to the
holdout after the exchange offer is completed. Still, courts have
"integrated" post-tender offer payments with the tender offer in
related contexts, 8" and the SEC could issue an interpretive release
codifying and extending this doctrine so that payments made
within a certain period after the exchange offer would also be
within the scope of Rule 10b-13, as amended.
Our second proposed rule would effectively structure com-
bined exchange offers and exit consent solicitations so that they
satisfied the requirements of our Form Three Offer. Indeed, such a
proposed rule has already been submitted to the SEC by a coali-
tion of sophisticated institutional investors. In late 1990, FMR
Corp., the parent company in the Fidelity Mutual Fund family,
and The Prudential Insurance Company of America jointly filed a
178 See notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
"' Rule 10b-13 provides that "[n]o person who makes a cash tender offer or exchange
offer for any equity security shall, directly or indirectly, purchase... any such security ....
otherwise than pursuant to such tender offer or exchange offer, from the time such tender
offer or exchange offer is publicly announced or otherwise made known by such person to
holders of the security to be acquired until the expiration of the [offer] ... . See 17 CFR §
240.10b-13 (1991).
180 Unlike § 14(d) of the Williams Act, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
applies to all securities, including debt securities. See In re Washington Public Power Sup-
ply System Securities Litigation, 623 F Supp 1466 (W D Wash 1985).
181 See Field v Trump, 850 F2d 938 (2d Cir 1988) (holding that the "best price" provi-
sion of § 14(d)(7) of the Williams Act was violated where premium was paid to one party
after purported "withdrawal" of tender offer). See also City Nat'l Bank v American Com-
monwealth Fin. Corp., 801 F2d 714 (4th Cir 1986) (Rule 10b-13 violated where shares were
paid for during pendency of tender offer, even though agreement to purchase occurred prior
thereto).
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rule-making petition with the SEC seeking a revision of Rule 14e-1
that would preclude any solicitation of consents or proxies during a
tender offer unless the offer "remains open until the expiration of
ten business days after the results of the concluded solicitation of
approval have been publicly disclosed."182 In short, these institu-
tional investors wanted the right to vote before they tender-in
effect, so that they could decide to tender if they failed in an ear-
lier attempt to defeat the consent solicitation. As discussed earlier,
we think this is the correct solution to the problem of coercion be-
cause it allows costless resistance but also permits the majority of
the bondholders to discipline holdouts. The fact that sophisticated
institutional investors that are not known for seeking additional
governmental regulation have proposed it increases our sense that
a market intervention is appropriate to this extent.
Finally, our third proposed rule would address the problem of
vote buying. We recognize that courts have not barred vote buying
in the case of bondholders (even though it is generally forbidden
with respect to stock).83 We also understand that a variety of dis-
tinctions can be made between bondholders and stockholders that
may make vote buying acceptable in the former case but not in the
latter.184 Still, these distinctions are not relevant to the legal rule
that we think should preclude vote buying in the context of the
tender offer/exit consent solicitation: the SEC's "best price"
182 See letter dated November 16, 1990, from Robert C. Pozen, General Counsel, FMR
Corp., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, United States Securities & Exchange Commission
(on file with U Chi L Rev). Eight other institutions, including several major insurance com-
panies, joined in the petition.
1'3 For a case upholding vote buying in the bondholder context, see Kass, CA Nos 8700,
8701, 8711. Because no fiduciary duty exists between the corporation and its bondholders,
vote buying by the issuer from bondholders does not breach any duty of trust. However, in
Kass, the court did suggest that payments selectively made to some bondholders but not
available to all might breach an implied covenant of good faith.
In the case of stock, vote buying has been historically prohibited both on statutory and
fiduciary grounds. See NY Bus Corp L § 609(e) (McKinney 1991); Chew v Inverness Man-
agement Corp., 352 A2d 426, 429-30 (Del Chanc 1975). For the modern Delaware test, see
Schreiber v Carney, 447 A2d 17 (Del Chanc 1982).
18'4 For example, it can be argued that the bondholders' rights and expectations are
limited to those created by contract, while shareholders may rely on a broader fiduciary
right. The general objection to vote buying in the political sphere is that it may encourage
corruption or at least the derogation of a civil duty. Given the bondholders' very narrow
entitlements, this potential for pervasive corruption or moral erosion seems less plausible.
Chancellor Allen reviewed these and other distinctions in Kass, CA Nos 8700, 8701, 8711,




rule.185 Essentially, a bondholder that votes against the proposed
indenture amendment receives a lesser total payment for its bonds
than does a bondholder that receives the consent fee. When other-
wise identical securities receive different prices in the same tender
or exchange offer, the "best price" rule should be seen as violated.
Obviously, this argument requires that the payment for the exit
consent be integrated with the tender price in order to reach the
conclusion that the "best price" rule has been violated. Clearly, the
two transactions are integrally related, and at least one SEC "no
action" letter has integrated a contemporaneous payment for
proxy consents with a tender offer and deemed the former part of
the tender offer.' 86 Under our proposed interpretation, it would be-
come impossible to pay exit consent fees if the consent solicitation
was occurring during the pendency of a tender offer. With this re-
striction and the use of a Form Three Offer, we do not believe
bondholder choice can be distorted by coercive exchange offers.
Still, the issue of SEC authority remains. Can the SEC extend
the § 14(d) rules to apply to debt securities by relying on § 14(e)?
In fact, at the time the SEC adopted Rule 14d-10, it partly relied
upon § 14(e) for its authority. 8 7 Because § 14(e) does apply to
debt tender offers, the authority it provided for Rule 14d-10 sug-
gests that the rule can be expanded to cover debt offers as well. 88
The problem with this interpretation, however, is that the Su-
preme Court's decision in Schreiber v Burlington Northern,
Inc.,8s implies that the SEC is empowered under § 14(e) to adopt
only disclosure requirements, not substantive rules. 9 ° In short, §
185 Rule 14d-10(a)(2) sets forth this rule. See note 172. The "best price" rule is in turn
based on § 14(d)(7). Unlike § 14(d)(6), which speaks of "equity securities," § 14(d)(7) makes
no reference to equity securities, but simply requires that the "increased consideration" be
paid "to each security holder whose securities are taken up . . . ." 17 CFR § 240.14(d)
(1991).
181 See Playtex, 1988 SEC No-Act LEXIS at *11. This no-action letter was in the con-
text of a different rule (Rule 14e-l(b), 17 CFR § 240.14), but the issue of integration is
identical.
187 See Amendments to Tender Offer Rules-All-Holders and Best-Price, 1986 SEC
LEXIS 1179, *20 (Jul 11) ("While not essential to the adoption of the Rules, Section 14(e)
of the Exchange Act provides additional authority to adopt these rules.").
I" In Polaroid Corp. v Disney, 862 F2d 987, 995-96 (3d Cir 1988), the validity of Rule
14d-10 was upheld against an attack that it exceeded the SEC's authority. However, the
court principally relied on the proration provision in § 14(d)(6) as justifying the rule, and
this provision does not apply to debt offers.
188 472 US 1, 11-12 (1985).
190 But see Finnegan v Campeau Corp., 915 F2d 824, 831 (2d Cir 1990):
Finnegan asserts that the SEC is. . . only empowered to regulate in the area of dis-
closure. This assertion misperceives the scope of the federal agency's power. . . . The
SEC is able to regulate agreements between bidders by virtue of its authority to define
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14(e) does not prohibit manipulative conduct "unless there has
been some element of deception through a material misrepresenta-
tion or omission." 191 Such a narrow reading of § 14(e) is certainly
possible, but it ignores that the rules adopted to date by the SEC
have often had only a tangential relationship to disclosure. 192 In
this light, we believe that any SEC effort to generalize the "best
price" rule by extending it to debt tender offers stands on at least
as firm a foundation as the twenty business day rule and should be
upheld if challenged. 93 Indeed, a special feature of the rule pro-
posed by Fidelity and Prudential is that it reads simply as a timing
rule-one that gives securityholders additional time (ten business
days) to decide after the results of the solicitation have been pub-
licly announced.9 ' This is effectively indistinguishable from the
rationale for the twenty business day rule.
At present, the SEC does not seem inclined to move in the
direction we propose, but has instead informally adopted a new
policy that has the indirect effect of discouraging consent solicita-
tions that seek to strip the protective covenants from the inden-
ture. The SEC's staff now takes the position that when significant
covenants are eliminated by a bondholder vote, the effect is to ex-
change new securities for old, even though the bondholder rejects
the exchange offer. 195 In short, the issuer is substituting a new se-
curity free of covenants for the old bond with protective covenants.
As a result, the issuer must either register the new bonds under the
Securities Act of 1933 or find an exemption from registration. One
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative practices and to prescribe means to prevent such
practices. 15 USC § 78(n)(e). Through its power to prohibit fraudulent activity, the
SEC has supervisory authority over the submission of joint bids or other agreements in
the corporate auction contest.
If Finnegan is correct in this statement that the SEC can regulate under § 14(e) matters
only tangentially related to disclosure, then Rule 14d-10 can easily be extended to debt
tender offers.
191 Polaroid, 862 F2d at 994.
192 For example, Rule 14e-l(a) requires a bidder to hold a tender offer open for a mini-
mum period of 20 business days. See Rule 14e-l(a), 17 CFR § 240.14e-l(a) (1991). Indeed,
none of the rules set forth in subsections (a) through (d) of Rule 14e-1 relates to disclosure.
11" We also consider it relevant that § 14(d)(7) of the Williams Act, 15 USC § 78n(d)(7)
(1982), which is the statutory foundation of the "best price" rule, specifically refers to "se-
curity holders whose securities are taken up and paid for pursuant to the tender offer" and
does not use the term "equity securities" (as § 14(d)(6), which deals with proration rights,
does). The implication here is that § 14(d)(7) has a broader scope than simply equity
securities.
I" See note 182 and accompanying text.
195 See George A. Greenslade, SEC and Consent Solicitations of Debentureholders, NY
L J 1 (Jul 5, 1991); Case and Harwood, Current Issues in Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plans at
139 (cited in note 8).
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well-known exemption from registration in the Securities Act of
1933 applies to exchange offers, 9" but it has a number of limita-
tions that inhibit the issuer's ability to conduct an exchange offer
under it. 9 Although we are sympathetic to the SEC's goal, we be-
lieve we have proposed a cleaner, simpler approach that does not
overregulate all debt exchange offers in order to preclude a few
pernicious ones.
CONCLUSION
The coercive potential of debt exchange and tender offers is
hard to judge, but easy to correct. Often, apparent coercion by
management actually masks efforts by the bondholders to protect
themselves against holdouts. Yet, the appropriate response to the
holdout problem is a measured one: namely, the Form Three Offer
in which the vote on the indenture amendments precedes and is
independent of the offer, so that bondholders can both vote against
the amendments and later accept the exchange if they are unsuc-
cessful in their opposition. Such a procedure makes resistance ef-
fectively costless to the bondholders and thus enables them to dis-
cipline holdouts without subjecting themselves to the risk that
management's tactics may penalize all the bondholders.
Ideally, private contracting could implement our proposed re-
form, but we are sufficiently realistic to recognize that the remedy
we envision must have been discerned by practitioners, and yet it
has not been adopted. Moreover, private contracting cannot pro-
tect the holders of outstanding bonds. Protection might also be
achieved through judicial interpretation of indenture language
presently in use, but no movement in this direction is apparent.
Hence, both to deal with the inertial forces that inhibit inno-
vation in bond contracts and to provide a remedy for holders of
196 Section 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act of 1933 exempts from the registration require-
ments of that Act any security exchanged by the issuer with its existing holders exclusively,
where no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly for soliciting such ex-
change. See 15 USC § 77(c)(a)(9) (1988).
297 To use the § 3(a)(9) exemption, the issuer must comply with the following restric-
tions: (1) it must offer the new securities to be exchanged only to existing holders; (2) the
new securities must be issued by same issuer, and not an affiliate or subsidiary; and (3) no
compensation may be paid for soliciting acceptances of the exchange offer. While the is-
suer's employees may to a degree solicit or recommend acceptance of the offer, investment
bankers, professional solicitors, or other agents may not be employed for this purpose.
Although this last restriction has been marginally relaxed in some recent SEC no-action
letters, see Seaman Furniture Co., 1989 SEC No-Act LEXIS 1014 (Oct 10), it still repre-
sents a substantial barrier for many issuers. See Vlahakis, Deleveraging-A Search for
Rules in a Financial Free-for-All at 485-88 (cited in note 6); Case and Howard, Current
Issues in Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plans at 36-38 (cited 'in note 8).
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outstanding debt securities, we propose two modest regulatory in-
novations: (1) an amendment of Rule 14e-1 to ensure that the
tender or exchange offer remains open for a sufficient period after
the results of the vote or consent solicitation are announced, so
that those who failed to block the amendment can tender on an
equal footing;198 and (2) an extension of the "best price" rule, Rule
14d-10, to apply to debt tender offers and to bar payments for
votes during the course of the tender offer.'99 Under the first rule,
even if the corporate issuer made it a condition of its offer that all
tenders of bonds had to be accompanied by an executed consent, it
still would be possible for the bondholders that initially had op-
posed the consent solicitation to change their votes and tender
with an executed consent once they learned that the solicitation
had been successful.2 0 0 We believe that, if vote buying were limited
as we propose and the vote preceded the tender offer, bondholders
would have an undistorted choice, and judicial review of the fair-
ness of the transaction would not be necessary.
Recently, some commentators have optimistically foreseen
"the privatization of bankruptcy" through out-of-court consensual
reorganizations .2 0 Even if our proposed rules were adopted, we are
somewhat less optimistic about the pace of progress toward such a
happy conclusion. As noted earlier, vulture funds can sometimes
resist indenture amendments and hold out even when their debt is
subordinated to the new class issued in exchange for it. Thus, the
prepackaged bankruptcy has distinct advantages because (1) two-
18 See note 182 and accompanying text.
1,9 See notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
200 It would be clearer and simpler just to prohibit the use of a tender condition that
the bonds be accompanied by an executed consent. Then, the issuer could still condition its
offer on a favorable vote on its proposed indenture amendments, but it could not discrimi-
nate between bondholders that voted for or against it. However, we doubt that § 14(e) of the
Williams Act authorizes a prophylactic rule against specified tender offer conditions. See
notes 188-94 and accompanying text. In contrast, Rule 14e-1 has long specified time limits,
and we here propose only to add another such limit (namely, requiring the tender offer to
continue for some reasonable period after the end of the consent solicitation and the an-
nouncement of the vote).
Corporate issuers could still frustrate our proposal by using a very short proration pe-
riod, which would require the bondholder to tender before the vote was concluded. This
could also be addressed under an addition to Rule 14e-1, but we do not see partial tender
offers as a realistic problem in this area where the issuer cannot afford to leave any substan-
tial number of the existing class of bonds outstanding. Put simply, partial bids aggravate,
rather than solve, the holdout problem for the issuer.
1o See Michael C. Jensen, Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bank-
ruptcy, 2 Continental Bank J Applied Corp Fin 35, 41-44 (No 1, Spring 1989).
1272 [58:1207
Bondholder Coercion
thirds of the bonds can vote to effect a mandatory reclassification,
(2) all members of the class must be treated equally, and (3) hold-
ing out is not legally possible. Yet, such a procedure entails the
risk of high bankruptcy costs. Hence, there is a plausible case, first
made by Professor Roe,202 for permitting bondholders to amend
the indenture so as to reduce the principal and interest rate or ex-
tend the maturity in a manner currently forbidden by the Trust
Indenture Act. 20 3 In effect, such deregulation would permit out-of-
court settlements to achieve the same mandatory reclassification of
the debt securities as the bankruptcy court alone can currently ac-
complish. Although such an altered set of legal rules would clearly
solve the holdout problem, the potential for coercion would be
even greater in this context, and thus rules paralleling our pro-
posed restrictions on vote buying seem all the more important.
Although we doubt that the "privatization of bankruptcy" will
come without legislative action to expand bondholder capacity to
amend the indenture and thus bind holdouts, we also believe that
"privatization" should not come without reforms (whether legisla-
tive or administrative) to give bondholders an unconstrained
choice. We believe we have proposed in this Article the simplest,
least intrusive means to this end.
202 See Roe, 97 Yale L J 232 (cited in note 24).
213 See note 54 and accompanying text.
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